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Abstract
We consider a dynamic Bertrand game, in which prices are publicly observed and each
￿rm receives a privately observed cost shock in each period. Although cost shocks are
independent across ￿rms, within a ￿rm costs follow a ￿rst-order Markov process. We analyze
the set of collusive equilibria available to ￿rms, emphasizing the best collusive scheme for
the ￿rms at the start of the game. In general, there is a tradeo￿ between productive
e￿ciency, whereby the low-cost ￿rm serves the market in a given period, and high prices.
We show that when costs are perfectly correlated over time within a ￿rm, if the distribution
of costs is log concave and ￿rms are su￿ciently patient, then the optimal collusive scheme
entails price rigidity: ￿rms set the same price and share the market equally, regardless
of their respective costs. Productive e￿ciency can be achieved in equilibrium under some
circumstances, but such equilibria are not optimal. When serial correlation of costs is
imperfect, partial productive e￿ciency is optimal. For the case of two cost types, ￿rst-best
collusion is possible if the ￿rms are patient relative to the persistence of cost shocks, but
not otherwise. We present numerical examples of ￿rst-best collusive schemes.
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A rich literature analyzes the problem of collusion in repeated games. In one important class
of models, the price or output decisions of individual ￿rms are imperfectly observed by other
￿rms. Green and Porter (1982) and Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1986) analyze the case
where individual ￿rm output decisions are not observed; instead, a noisy signal (the market
price) of the ￿rms’ output decisions is publicly observed. Imperfect observability of actions is
an important concern in some settings, as when the product is an intermediate input and the
customers are ￿rms who negotiate prices individually. In other settings, however, the relevant
￿rm behavior is publicly observed. For example, in a government procurement auction, the bids
are usually publicly available; and many consumer goods are sold at publicly posted prices.
Even when ￿rm behavior is publicly observed, colluding ￿rms may confront signi￿cant
informational problems. Firms’ production costs often have important components that are
private information, due to variations in supply contracts and process innovations. In an ideal
collusive scheme, ￿rms would communicate truthfully about their respective costs, so that,
at each point in time, they could both maintain high prices and assign all production to the
￿rm(s) with the lowest production costs. Such a scheme is possible, however, only if ￿rms have
incentives to communicate truthfully and accept the corresponding market-share assignments.
This discussion motivates consideration of a di￿erent class of collusion models, in which
￿rms are privately informed as to their cost types and take actions that are publicly observed.
Aoyagi (2003), Athey and Bagwell (2001), Athey, Bagwell and Sanchirico (2004) and Skryzpacz
and Hopenhayn (2004) develop models of this kind, where ￿rms play a repeated Bertrand
pricing game, or equivalently, act as bidders in a series of procurement auctions. Importantly,
these papers focus on the case where cost types are independent over time. This assumption is
not always plausible. In some procurement auction settings, for example, individual ￿rms may
enjoy persistent sources of cost advantage. Similarly, for a ￿rm selling products in a market,
there are often many components of cost. Over time, di￿erent parts of the production process
may see improvement, or the ￿rm may sign new contracts for inputs, where the contracts
may last several periods. Although ￿rms may have a general understanding of the overall cost
structure of their competitors, they may lack speci￿c knowledge of the factors that change over
time and a￿ect competitor costs.1
In this paper, we study collusion among ￿rms that are privately informed as to their respec-
tive cost types, where cost shocks are persistent over time. The case of perfect persistence is a
special case of our analysis.2 Formally, we model ￿rms as interacting over an in￿nite horizon
1 The relevance of private information about persistent aspects of production cost has been emphasized by
observers of important recent collusive agreements. See, e.g., Connor’s (2001, p. 17) discussion of the lysine
cartel. Likewise, McMillan (1991) reports that private information as to costs was an important consideration
among colluding construction ￿rms in Japan.
2 LaCasse (2001) and Chakrabarti (2001) analyze collusion among ￿rms when costs are perfectly persistent.
These papers construct examples of separating and pooling equilibria, but do not analyze the optimal collusive
1in a dynamic game of Bertrand competition, where in any period each ￿rm privately observes
its cost shock before publicly selecting its price. So as to allow the greatest possible scope
for collusion, we assume that colluding ￿rms can communicate before setting their prices; this
allows us to analyze the extent to which communication is useful for colluding ￿rms, an im-
portant question for antitrust policy. We assume as well that ￿rms can allocate market share
unequally among themselves, so long as they charge the same price. Although cost shocks are
independent across ￿rms, within a ￿rm costs follow a ￿rst-order Markov process.3 Under the
assumption that demand is inelastic, we analyze the set of collusive equilibria available to ￿rms,
emphasizing the best collusive scheme for the ￿rms at the start of the game. Given that cost
types are private information and persistent, our game is not a repeated game but rather a
dynamic game with hidden state variables. We are interested in what we call Perfect Public
Bayesian Equilibria (PPBE) of this game. This is a re￿nement of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium,
and it is the natural extension of the Perfect Public Equilibrium (PPE) (Fudenberg, Levine,
and Maskin, 1994) solution concept for the dynamic Bayesian game that we study.4 Relatively
little prior work has analyzed dynamic games where players have (perfectly or imperfectly)
persistent private information, and thus we believe that the techniques developed here may be
useful in other contexts as well.5
Whether costs shocks are persistent or not, ￿rms face important incentive constraints when
attempting to achieve productive e￿ciency, whereby the lowest-cost ￿rm serves the market in
each period. Productive e￿ciency requires that lower-cost ￿rms expect higher market share,
and this creates a temptation for higher-cost ￿rms to mimic lower-cost ￿rms. Such mimicry
can be dissuaded if a ￿rm expects that, following a period where it reports lower costs, it will
equilibria. LaCasse (2001) studies the case of perfect substitutes and downward-sloping demand, with two cost
types; Chakrabarti (2001) analyzes Cournot oligopoly with discrete types.
3 When types are correlated across ￿rms, collusion may be easier. First, the loss associated with failing to
allocate production to the lowest-cost ￿rm is smaller, since ￿rm costs are typically similar. Second, it is less
costly to provide incentives, since a ￿rm may be punished for reported cost types that di￿er from those of its
competitors. See Aoyagi (2003) for discussion of collusion when types are correlated across players.
4 Cole and Kocherlakota (2001) develop an analogous concept for dynamic games with hidden actions and
hidden state variables; they refer to their concept as Markov-Private Perfect Equilibrium.
5 For example, the folk theorem of Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin (1994) does not apply to dynamic games
with persistent private information. Persistent private information has received attention in other contexts.
The early studies of reputation formation (Kreps and Wilson, 1982; Milgrom and Roberts, 1982) analyze ￿nite-
horizon dynamic games in which there is a small probability that a player is a perfectly persistent and irrational
type. Recently, Abreu and Gul (2000) and Abreu and Pearce (2003) extend and apply this approach to dynamic
bargaining games. Our work di￿ers in that all types are rational, occur with substantial probability, and may
change over time; further, we focus on cooperative equilibria, and revelation of types in each period is necessary
for e￿ciency. Kennan (2001) analyzes a dynamic bargaining game between a buyer and a seller, in which the
buyer’s private information may change over time and follows a two-state Markov process. Our work di￿ers in
that it allows for all agents to have private information; furthermore, we focus on cooperative equilibria. Watson
(2002) examines the role of perfectly persistent private information in a model of dynamic relationship formation
wherein the stakes of the relationship evolve over time. In the dynamic contracting literature, La￿ont and Tirole
(1988) highlight a ratchet e￿ect, when the agent’s type is perfectly persistent and only short-term contracts
are feasible. Fernandez and Phelan (2000) numerically analyze a dynamic principal-agent problem where the
agent’s type follows a Markov process; and Battaglini (2005) studies long-term contracts that induce separation
in similar settings. We discuss the dynamic contracting literature further in Section 3.
2receive lower market share or endure lower prices. For the cartel, the bene￿t of productive
e￿ciency in the current period thus must be balanced against the costs of possibly ine￿cient
production and/or low prices in future periods. Future productive ine￿ciency would arise, if
future market share were withheld from a ￿rm that continues to enjoy low costs.
At an intuitive level, it is not immediately clear whether collusion becomes easier or harder
when cost types are correlated over time. On the one hand, when cost types are persistent, it
becomes possible for a ￿rm to make inferences about rival’s costs, using past price observations.
Accordingly, one might expect that persistence would give ￿rms more instruments with which
to reveal information and assign production e￿ciently. On the other hand, persistence creates
a new incentive to mimic another cost type, since mimicry today in￿uences rival’s beliefs in
the future. Indeed, when cost types exhibit persistence, repeated play of the equilibrium of a
one-shot game is no longer an equilibrium in the dynamic game, and so simply constructing
any equilibrium (let alone the best or worst) is non-trivial.
We begin our formal analysis by constructing the best pooling equilibrium. In pooling
equilibria, strategies do not depend on ￿rms’ past or present cost types. These equilibria are
appealing given the considerations just described, since there is no incentive to manipulate op-
ponent beliefs. In the best pooling equilibrium, ￿rms share the market equally at the customer’s
reservation price in every period. Firms thus achieve high prices but no productive e￿ciency.
In the case of a deviation, they switch to a \punishment" pooling equilibrium that takes a
\carrot-stick" form: ￿rms start the punishment by sharing the market at a low price and after
each period switch with some probability to an equilibrium where all ￿rms share the market at
the reservation price. The best pooling equilibrium exists if ￿rms are su￿ciently patient.
Under the assumption that the (initial) distribution of costs is log-concave, we next establish
that the best pooling equilibrium is actually the best (unconstrained) equilibrium in the limiting
case where costs are perfectly persistent, and is close to optimal when costs are close to perfectly
persistent. The case with perfectly persistent costs raises some interesting issues. At ￿rst, it
might seem that the dynamic game would immediately collapse to a static one when costs do not
change over time. But this intuition is incomplete: even though costs do not change, ￿rms can
still make di￿erent choices at di￿erent points in time. For example, there exist equilibria where
￿rms use an initial signaling phase to reveal cost types, followed by a phase where prices are
higher but market shares are allocated according to the early signals. Under the log-concavity
assumption, however, the equilibrium that maximizes ex ante cartel payo￿s is extremely simple,
when ￿rms are su￿ciently patient: all ￿rms share the market at the customer’s reserve price.6
6 Interestingly, the optimal equilibrium is the same as the optimal equilibrium in the model studied by Athey,
Bagwell, and Sanchirico (2004), in which costs are independent over time but ￿rms use Strongly Symmetric
Perfect Public Equilibria (SPPE), whereby at the beginning of each period, strategies and expected payo￿s are
symmetric. The SPPE solution concept is appropriate when the winning price, or even the vector of ￿rm prices,
is publicly observed, but a ￿rm is not able to identify the individual behavior of any ￿rm other than itself. In
contrast, in this paper we do not use the strong symmetry restriction, and in general ￿rms will not view one
another symmetrically after the beginning of the game.
3In contrast, when the log-concavity assumption is relaxed, we show that equilibria with an initial
signaling phase may yield greater pro￿ts than the best pooling equilibria. Intuitively, equilbria
with an initial signaling phase entail a tradeo￿ between the cost of low prices in the signaling
phase and the bene￿t of greater productive e￿ciency in the future; we provide conditions under
which the bene￿t dominates when log-concavity fails. In such cases, the equilibrium construction
must respect the inability of ￿rms to commit to their response to the revelation of information.
We next return to the case of imperfectly persistent costs and establish that some productive
e￿ciency is optimal when ￿rms are su￿ciently patient. Indeed, if ￿rms are su￿ciently patient
to enforce the best pooling equilibrium, then they can enforce as well a simple \odd-even"
equilibrium that achieves partial productive e￿ciency and yields higher expected pro￿ts. An
odd-even equilibrium employs a simple two-period rotation scheme. In odd periods, ￿rms
announce their types, and the low-cost ￿rm gets a high market share. In even periods, if a ￿rm
received the high market share in the previous period, it now receives a reduced market share,
where the amount of the reduction is chosen to deter mimicry in the previous (odd) period. If
costs are independent over time, this scheme would induce some productive e￿ciency in odd
periods, while in even periods the market would be served by an average-cost ￿rm. This scheme
is less e￿ective, however, when costs are close to perfectly persistent, since high-cost ￿rms are
then likely to serve the market in even periods.
Given that persistence compromises the e￿ectiveness of the odd-even scheme, it is natural to
ask whether it is possible to attain ￿rst-best collusion. We know that when the serial correlation
is equal to zero, the model is equivalent to that of Athey and Bagwell (2001), who show that
￿rst-best collusion is possible. But it is not immediately clear that ￿rst-best can be attained
or approximated in a PPBE once cost types are persistent. With even slight persistence, the
game changes in fundamental ways: ￿rms have new incentives to signal and manipulate their
opponents’ beliefs in ways that may advantage them in the future.
We show that, despite these complications, when the persistence of types is not too high
relative to the patience of ￿rms, ￿rst-best collusion is possible. The collusive equilibrium calls
for ￿rms to announce their cost types, and ￿rms that have announced low cost in the recent
past give up market share in states of the world where the ￿rms have the same cost type. If
￿rms are su￿ciently patient, they can be induced to wait for such states. We present numerical
examples of ￿rst-best collusive schemes. Although these schemes involve subtle incentives, they
can be described fairly easily and computed analytically for speci￿c parameter values.
Taken together, our results indicate that when patience is high relative to the persistence
of cost types, the best equilibrium entails productive e￿ciency, high prices, and market shares
that are less positively correlated over time than are the cost types. This type of equilibrium is
non-stationary and fairly complex. In contrast, when persistence of cost types is large relative
to patience of ￿rms, but ￿rms are still moderately patient, the best equilibrium is very simple:
it entails productive ine￿ciency, high prices, and stable market shares. A variety of empirical
4evidence and descriptive accounts of collusion establish an association between collusion and
rigid prices and stable market shares (Athey, Bagwell and Sanchirico, 2004); yet, there are also
case studies of collusive schemes that were quite sophisticated and where market share was
exchanged intertemporally among co-conspirators (Athey and Bagwell, 2001).
Finally, we consider whether equilibria with productive e￿ciency in every period exist at all
(even with low prices) when cost types are very persistent. We show that in the continuum-type
case, it is sometimes possible to construct an equilibrium that entails productive e￿ciency in
every period, but any such equilibrium yields per-period pro￿ts equal to those in the one-shot
Nash equilibrium. The equilibrium we construct has above-competitive prices in the ￿rst period
but lower prices subsequently. Intuitively, a ￿rm gains when it is perceived to have higher costs,
since rivals then price less aggressively in future periods. If ￿rms are too patient, the incentive
for a lower-cost type to mimic the price of a higher-cost type in the initial signaling phase is
overwhelming, and no equilibrium with productive e￿ciency exists.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. The next two sections
analyze pooling equilibria and separating equilibria, respectively. In Section 5, we consider
punishment equilibria that entail productive e￿ciency. Section 6 concludes.
2. The Model
In this section, we introduce the model. There are I ￿rms that meet in periods t = 1;::;1:
Throughout, we use the following notational conventions. If Xi represents a set, then X =
(X1;::;XI): Given a sequence fxi;tg1
t=1; where xi;t 2 Xi; xt denotes (x1;t;::;xI;t); xt
i denotes
(xi;1;::;xi;t); and xt = (x1;::;xt):
We posit I ex ante identical ￿rms that meet in periods t = 1;::;1 to engage in Bertrand
competition for sales in a homogenous-good market. Firms discount the future at rate ￿ 2 (0;1).
We assume that in each period, demand is inelastic, and there is a unit mass of identical
consumers with a ￿xed reservation price r, where r > ￿, with ￿ being the highest possible cost
for ￿rms. Thus, demand is stationary over time, and consumers are not strategic players. Let
pi;t 2 R+ denote the price chosen by ￿rm i.
Firm i’s \cost type" in time t, ￿i;t; follows a ￿rst-order Markov processes with support
￿i ￿ [￿;￿]. The commonly known distribution function is F(￿j￿i;t￿1); where ￿i;t￿1 is the ￿rm’s
cost type in period t ￿ 1. Let ￿i;1 be drawn from the prior F0(￿) (where this prior is the
stationary distribution of the Markov process): To avoid the need for special notation, we
use the convention that F(￿j￿i;0) = F0(￿) throughout (even though there may be no such ￿i;0
that returns the prior). To represent vectors of cost types and probability distributions, let
F(￿j￿t￿1) = (F(￿j￿1;t￿1);￿￿￿ ;F(￿j￿I;t￿1)): We emphasize that the cost shocks are not a￿ected
by any actions the ￿rms may take.
We refer to two special cases of this model throughout the paper.
5Model De￿nitions:
Model 1: ￿i = f￿;￿g 2 R2; with ￿ < ￿: Both F0(￿) and F(￿j￿i;t￿1) have full support on ￿i
for all ￿i;t￿1 2 ￿i. We let ￿ = L and ￿ = H and use the notation for types interchangeably.
We let ￿￿i;t￿1 = F(Lj￿i;t￿1). We focus on the case of positive serial correlation, whereby
1 > ￿L > ￿H > 0:
Model 2: ￿i = [￿;￿] ￿ R: Cost types are perfectly persistent, so that F(￿j￿i;t￿1) places all
of the probability weight on ￿i;t￿1: F0 has a strictly positive density over its support.
Thus, Model 1 is a two-type model in which types are imperfectly persistent, whereas Model 2
allows for a continuum of types and focuses on the case of perfect persistence.
Note that if the game ends after period 1, and ￿rms play the Bertrand pricing game de-
scribed above, the model is equivalent to a one-shot, ￿rst-price procurement auction with posted
reservation price r; where types are drawn from distribution F0(￿): For both models, the static
equilibria when all ￿rms draw types from F0(￿) entail productive e￿ciency and prices that are
always weakly less than the highest cost type.7
Each period t of the dynamic game follows a timeline, in which each ￿rm i : (i) privately
observes a new cost shock, ￿i;t 2 ￿i; (ii) may engage in \cheap talk," whereby it publicly
announces its cost type ai;t 2 Ai (announcements are simultaneous), where jAij ￿ j￿ij; (iii)
simultaneously selects a price pi;t 2 Pi = R+ and a maximum quantity it is willing to sell,
qi;t 2 Qi = [0;1], both of which are publicly observed; (iv) receives market share ’i(pt;qt);
where ’i : P ￿Q ! [0;1] is an exogenous, stationary rationing rule such that if N(pt) is the set
of ￿rms charging the lowest price, qi;t ￿ ’i(pt;qt) ￿ min(1=jN(pt)j;qi;t): Thus, if the quantity
restrictions for the low-price ￿rms sum to one, each will get exactly its quantity restriction.
Also, if each low-price ￿rm selects qi;t ￿ 1=N(pt); then each low-price ￿rm receives a market
share allocation of 1=N(pt): If
P
i2N(pt) qi;t < 1; an analogous rationing rule is used to allocate
the residual market share to the set of ￿rms charging the next-lowest price, and so on until the
market share is exhausted or there are no ￿rms remaining with non-zero quantity restrictions.
The details of the rationing rule are not important for any of our results.
We pause to provide some additional explanation for the announcements and quantity re-
strictions. They are included to allow ￿rms to share the market in unequal proportions as a
function of ￿rm cost types. An equilibrium might specify that following some history, if two
￿rms both announce low costs and tie for the lowest price, then one ￿rm gets only 1=3 of the
market. If that ￿rm deviates from the agreement and takes more than 1/3, the deviation will be
observable by opponents. If announcements were eliminated, then quantity restrictions might
lead ￿rms to underproduce in some states of the world. However, if the model was modi￿ed
7 Athey and Bagwell (2001) and Riley and Samuelson (1981) characterize the static equilibria for Models
1 and 2, respectively. When ￿rms can be asymmetric (i.e., have di￿erent cost distributions), there is typically
productive ine￿ciency in Model 2. Athey and Bagwell (2004) characterize the static equilibrium for asymmetric
￿rms for Model 1, while the static equilibrium for Model 2 is characterized by Maskin and Riley (2000).
6so that quantity restrictions came after pricing decisions, prices could take over some of the
coordination role of the quantity restrictions. In the absence of both announcements and quan-
tity restrictions, the set of possible ￿rm market shares would be quite limited. Despite this,
below we show that in many cases, announcements and quantity restrictions are not necessary
to achieve optimal equilibria. In other cases, eliminating these features would lead to reduc-
tions in e￿ciency for some parameter values. Including them allows us to analyze whether
communication is useful, an important question for antitrust policy.
Summarizing, within a period, after announcements, prices, and quantity restrictions are
determined as (at;pt;qt), a ￿rm will receive pro￿ts (pi;t￿￿i;t)’i(pt;qt): Notice that announce-
ments do not directly a￿ect pro￿ts; they simply in￿uence the ￿rms’ choices of prices and
quantity restrictions.
Let Zi = Ai￿Pi￿Qi and Z = (Z1;::;ZI): The set of possible \period strategies" in a given
period t for ￿rm i is given by Si ￿ fsi;tjsi;t : A ￿ ￿i ! Zig; where the elements si;t of Si must
be decomposable into three component functions, si;t = (￿i;t;￿i;t; i;t); satisfying the following
restrictions: The announcement function ￿i;t depends only on the ￿rm’s own cost type. Since
announcements precede pricing and quantity decisions, the latter choices depend on both the
￿rm’s own type as well as the announcements of others. In other words, when types are given
by ￿t; ￿rm i ￿rst announces ai;t = ￿i;t(￿i;t): Then each ￿rm i observes a￿i;t = ￿￿i;t(￿￿i;t):
Next, each ￿rm i sets price pi;t = ￿i;t(at;￿i;t) and chooses quantity restriction qi;t =  i;t(at;￿i;t):
Finally, market shares are determined by ’i;t(pt;qt):
In this paper, we will occasionally analyze a situation where one ￿rm wishes to undercut
another. Selectively, in those cases, we will use the convention that " > 0 is the smallest price
increment, so that a ￿rm undercuts by charging " or 2" less than its opponent. However, we
will not necessarily include " in any pro￿t calculations. Thus, when we say that \￿rm j charges
pi ￿ ";" this should be interpreted as saying that ￿rm j charges a negligible amount less than
pi; thereby winning the market at (essentially) price pi:
2.1. Interim Pro￿ts
We now introduce notation for the \interim" payo￿s for ￿rm i, after ￿rm i knows its cost type
in period t but before ￿rm i acts. Let ￿i be a probability distribution over ￿i: Given a function
g, we let E￿i;t[g(￿i;t)j￿i] denote the expectation over values of ￿i;t taking ￿i as the probability
distribution over ￿i;t: When ￿i = F(￿;￿i;t￿1); we simply write E￿i;t[g(￿i;t)j￿i;t￿1]:
At the interim stage, for any given period strategy si;t = (￿i;t;￿i;t; i;t); a ￿rm can deviate
from this strategy in several ways. The ￿rm might choose a deviant announcement (ai;t 6=
￿i;t(￿i;t)); it might choose prices and quantity restrictions that are inconsistent with the set of
realized announcements or its own type (pi;t 6= ￿i;t(at;￿i;t) or qi;t 6=  i;t(at;￿i;t)); or it might
do some combination of these things. All of these possible deviations can be represented by an
alternative strategy ~ si;t 6= si;t.
7However, there is one particular type of deviation, termed an \on-schedule deviation," that
will play a special role in the analysis. In this type of deviation, ~ si;t speci￿es that type ￿i;t
\mimics" ^ ￿i;t 6= ￿i;t: that is, ~ ￿i;t(￿i;t) = ￿i;t(^ ￿i;t); and for all at; ~ ￿i;t(at;￿i;t) = ￿i;t(at; ^ ￿i;t) and
~  i;t(at;￿i;t) =  i;t(at; ^ ￿i;t): Although this deviation can be represented directly through the
strategy ~ si;t; it will be more convenient to introduce direct notation for mimicry. Formally, if
￿rm i’s beliefs about opponent types at the start of period t are given by ￿￿i; then the following
expressions represent interim expected market share and expected pro￿ts for ￿rm i when ￿rm
i has type ￿i;t but mimics the behavior that type ^ ￿i;t would use given period strategy si;t :
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We emphasize that the notation is redundant (that is, given ~ si;t as de￿ned above, ￿ ￿i(^ ￿i;t;￿i;t;st;￿￿i) =
￿ ￿i(￿i;t;￿i;t;(~ si;t;s￿i;t);￿￿i)), and we do not in any way limit the set of possible deviations to
these \on-schedule" deviations.
We distinguish on-schedule deviations from \o￿-schedule" deviations. In an o￿-schedule
deviation, a ￿rm chooses an action or a series of actions that no cost type should have chosen
in equilibrium. Since o￿-schedule deviations are observable and should never happen in equi-
librium, they can be severely punished so as to deter the deviation. In contrast, on-schedule
deviations are not observable as deviations. Thus, any future punishment associated with
mimicking ^ ￿i;t must be borne in equilibrium, when type ^ ￿i;t actually occurs.
We say that ￿rm i’s announcement is uninformative if there exists some constant ci such
that ￿i;t(￿i;t) = ci for all ￿i;t: In the case where all ￿rms’ announcements are uninformative,
￿ ￿i(^ ￿i;t;￿i;t;st;￿￿i) = (￿i;t(c; ^ ￿i;t) ￿ ￿i;t) ￿ ￿ mi(^ ￿i;t;st;￿￿i); (2.1)
that is, expected pro￿ts are equal to price minus cost times expected market share. In many of
the collusive equilibria we construct, the price will not depend directly on the announcements,
as it will be constant at r; then, (2.1) can be used.
2.2. Evolution of Beliefs in the Dynamic Game
We now develop notation for the evolution of ￿rms’ beliefs using Bayes’ rule. Let ￿￿i be the
set of probability distributions over ￿i: The \product structure" of the game implies that ￿rm
j’s private information about its history of cost types and past deviations does not provide ￿rm
j with any relevant information about ￿rm i. We thus impose that the beliefs of each ￿rm j 6= i
about ￿rm i’s cost shocks evolve in the same way along the equilibrium path. We can then
say that \￿rms’ beliefs about opponents in period t are given by ￿t," by which we mean that
8for each ￿rm j 6= i; ￿rm j has belief ￿i;t about ￿i;t. Note that ￿i;t may di￿er from F(￿j￿i;t￿1);
which is the belief that ￿rm i has about ￿i;t at the start of period t:
Let ￿
p
i;t be the posterior belief that ￿rms j 6= i hold about ￿i;t at the end of period t, after
observing zt; given a conjectured period strategy si;t and the period’s prior belief ￿i;t: We say
that zt is compatible with si;t and ￿i;t if there exists some cost type ￿i;t such that ￿i;t is in the
support of ￿i;t and zi;t = si;t(at;￿i;t): In this case, the posterior ￿
p
i;t is determined using Bayes’
rule. On the other hand, if zt is not compatible with si;t and ￿i;t; then Bayes’ rule does not pin
down the posterior beliefs ￿
p
i;t. The posterior belief is then speci￿ed by the analyst.
We let ~ T : ￿￿i ￿ Si ￿ Z ! 2￿￿i denote the correspondence that gives the set of possible
period t + 1 beliefs about ￿i;t given (￿i;t;si;t;zt): For all zt that are compatible with si;t and
￿i;t, ~ T is single-valued. It is the belief that, as a Bayesian (and given its knowledge of the
stochastic process for the evolution of costs) ￿rm j should have about ￿rm i at the beginning
of period t + 1; given that ￿rm j started period t with belief ￿i;t; conjectured that ￿rm i
used period strategy si;t; and observed a compatible vector of public actions zt: Formally,







Consider now (￿i;t;si;t;zt) such that zt is not compatible with si;t and ￿i;t: Then,
~ T(￿i;t;si;t;zt) =
n
￿i;t+1 2 ￿￿i : 9￿
p







The period t + 1 belief about ￿i;t+1 is then selected from this set, with the particular selection
corresponding to the posterior that is speci￿ed for period t: Note that even though Bayes’ rule
no longer determines the posterior belief ￿
p
i;t, the updating rule still places restrictions on beliefs
about ￿i;t+1: For example, if the posterior ￿
p
i;t places all of the probability weight on ￿i;t = ￿0,
then ￿i;t+1 = F(￿j￿i;t = ￿0); thus, if F has full support, ￿i;t+1 must have full support as well:
Henceforth, we let T(￿i;t;si;t;zt) 2 ~ T(￿i;t;si;t;zt) be a selection from ~ T (recalling that the
selection is pre-determined for zt that is compatible with si;t and ￿i;t). Then, we may describe
the evolution of beliefs in a simple, recursive form: ￿i;t+1 = T(￿i;t;si;t;zt): We may summarize
the updating function for all ￿rms at once as T(￿t;st;zt) = (T(￿1;t;s1;t;zt);:::;T(￿I;t;sI;t;zt)):
Consider some examples of the evolution of beliefs about opponents. If si;t assigns a unique
vector of public actions to each type, then ￿rm j can infer perfectly from zt the value of ￿i;t. In
that case, ￿i;t+1(￿) = Fi(￿j￿i;t): On the other hand, if ￿i;t = F0; and si;t always assigns the same
actions zi;t to all cost types, then after zt is observed, ￿i;t+1 = F0; since nothing is learned in
period t and F0 is the stationary distribution of the Markov process.
2.3. Extensive-Form Strategies in the Dynamic Game
To analyze this game, we need to specify a solution concept. We will consider Perfect Bayesian
Equilibria (PBE) that satisfy a further re￿nement, namely that player strategies depend on
public histories and their own payo￿-relevant private information, but not otherwise on their
history of private information. We refer to the solution concept we impose here as Perfect Public
9Bayesian Equilibrium (PPBE). As will be clear, PPBE is a natural extension of Perfect Public
Equilibrium (PPE) to dynamic Bayesian (rather than repeated) games. Given that ￿rms are ex
ante symmetric, we impose the further restriction that ￿rms use ex ante symmetric strategies;
that is, strategies are exchangeable as a function of public and private histories. This implies
that asymmetries in ￿rm strategies starting in period t arise as a result of asymmetric cost
realizations and behavior in the past. This restriction does not a￿ect the qualitative nature of
our results, but it greatly simpli￿es the exposition.
We begin with some notation. The observable public history in the dynamic game is an
in￿nite sequence of realized reports, prices, and quantity restrictions, ht = fat;pt;qtg. Let
Ht be the set of possible public histories at date t. In addition to the public history, at the
beginning of period t; ￿rm i knows ￿t￿1
i , its past history of cost types. We also assume that
after every period, ￿rms can observe the realization of some public randomization device and
then select continuation equilibria on this basis. To ease the notational burden, we do not
introduce explicit notation for the randomization process.
We consider \public strategies," whereby ￿rm i’s strategy maps any history with the same
ht￿1 and the same ￿i;t to the same actions. Firm i’s strategy in period t does not depend on
the private history ￿t￿1
i : It makes sense that ￿rm i would not care about past cost types once
it learns its current cost type: past cost types do not in￿uence its own beliefs (given that types
are Markov); and they were not observed by any opponents, so they do not a￿ect opponent
beliefs either. Thus, in our game, when all opponents use public strategies, each ￿rm has a best
response that is public. Given the stochastic process for cost types, our de￿nition of public
strategies is the analog of the standard de￿nition for repeated games.8
Firm i’s strategy in the extensive-form game can be described by a sequence ￿i;t, where
￿i;t : Ht￿1 ! Si and the dependence of actions on current cost types is incorporated in the
period strategies si;t 2 Si. The full (public and private) history of the game can be described
by fht;￿tg1
t=1: Given f￿t;￿tg1
t=1; a full path of play, fat;pt;qt;￿tg1
t=1, is induced. Payo￿s for
￿rm i at time 1 thus may be written as:
￿1
t=1 ￿t￿1(pi;t ￿ ￿i;t)’i(pt;qt);
where si;t = ￿i;t(ht￿1) 8i; and (ai;t;pi;t;qi;t) = si;t(￿t(￿t);￿i;t):
It is more useful to develop notation for the expected payo￿s for ￿rm i at time ￿, which
can be written as a function of beliefs about opponents ￿￿i;￿; public history h￿￿1; and ￿rm i’s
8 Our focus on PPBE thus excludes from consideration PPE that employ private strategies. See Kandori and
Obara (2006) for further discussion.










where, for all t ￿ ￿;
sj;t = ￿j;t(ht￿1) for all j 2 f1;::;Ig;
zj;t = (aj;t;pj;t;qj;t) = sj;t(￿t(￿t);￿j;t) for all j 2 f1;::;Ig; and
￿￿i;t+1 = T￿i(￿￿i;t; s￿i;t; zt):
When taking the expectation in this de￿nition, the distribution over future actions and cost
types is induced by the strategies and current beliefs about cost types. Using this notation, a
PPBE is a collection of public strategies f￿￿
tg1
t=1 such that ￿￿
i = f￿￿
i;tg1
t=1 is weakly optimal
at every information set, together with initial beliefs ￿1 and a belief updating function T 2 ~ T
that determines ￿rms’ beliefs about opponents at each date t so that, for all i; ht￿1; and zt;
￿i;t+1 = T(￿i;t;￿￿
i;t(ht￿1);zt): (2.2)
Formally, for all ￿i;￿; h￿￿1; and ￿rm i’s beliefs about the ￿rms’ opponents ￿￿i;￿ generated











It is straightforward to verify that our de￿nitions imply that a PPBE is a PBE.9
3. Pooling Equilibria
This section focuses on pooling equilibria, whereby strategies do not depend on ￿rms’ cost
shocks. In order to evaluate the e￿ciency of equilibria, we introduce the concept of \partial
productive e￿ciency." In a given period, if ￿rms sell to the entire unit-mass of consumers, then
the ￿rms achieve partial productive e￿ciency if the expected industry production cost (weighted
across ￿rms by market shares) is less than that which would be achieved were instead each ￿rm
assigned an equal share of the market. The ￿rms achieve productive e￿ciency, if the lowest-cost
￿rm (or ￿rms) always receives all market share. We also introduce the notion of a \scheme."
We use this word to refer to a set of strategies with particular properties. This terminology
is useful, since particular strategies may or may not represent equilibrium strategies, or may
represent equilibrium strategies only for particular parameter values. Given a [name] scheme,
we use the term \[name] equilibrium" to refer to a PPBE in which a [name] scheme is used.
9 See Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, pp. 331-3) for the requirements of PBE. One restriction that we have not
explicitly imposed on our selection T from ~ T is that ￿rm i’s belief about ￿rm j’s type is consistent with the
understanding that the behavior of any other ￿rm cannot signal this information. It would be cumbersome to
formally specify this requirement given that there are two stages in each period of the game, and the requirement
does not a￿ect any of the analysis we conduct in this paper. However, in general this requirement should also
be imposed on the selection T.
113.1. Pooling Equilibria Exist when Firms Are Patient
Pooling equilibria may take several forms. In one class of stationary pooling equilibria, along
the equilibrium path, the strategies specify that ￿rms always share the market equally at a
particular price. We refer to such strategies as a rigid-pricing scheme. In the best rigid-pricing
scheme, ￿rms share the market at the price r as long as no ￿rms deviate:
Rigid-Pricing Scheme: A set of strategies where, on the equilibrium path, ￿rms share the
market equally at a ￿xed price p0. Along the equilibrium path, for all i and t, pi;t = p0 and
qi;t = 1 (non-binding quantity restrictions), and announcements are uninformative. In a best
rigid-pricing scheme, p0 = r.
Another class of pooling equilibria use non-stationary strategies that take a \carrot-stick"
form. Formally, we de￿ne a carrot-stick scheme as follows:
Carrot-Stick Scheme: A set of strategies where, on and o￿ of the equilibrium path, an-
nouncements are uninformative and qi;t = 1 (non-binding quantity restrictions). There are
two states. In the war state, all ￿rms choose price pw < r; and in the reward state, all ￿rms
charge price equal to r. The ￿rms begin in the war state. In the war state, if all ￿rms choose
price pw in a given period; the ￿rms switch to the reward state with probability ￿ 2 [0;1]; and
return to the war state with probability 1 ￿ ￿: In the reward state, if all ￿rms choose price r
in a given period, the ￿rms remain in the reward state with probability 1. In each period, if
any ￿rm charges a price other than the assigned price, the ￿rms switch to the war state with
probability 1. In a worst carrot-stick scheme, in the initial period, a ￿rm with the highest type,
￿ ￿; is indi￿erent between choosing the price pw and charging a higher price, where by charging
a higher price the ￿rm would sell nothing and restart the scheme with probability 1.
In a carrot-stick scheme, ￿rms may be induced to price below cost in the present period,
when they anticipate the reward of getting a high price in the future. But no such scheme
can be used in a PPBE if the highest type, ￿ ￿; is unwilling to charge pw in the war state. In
particular, the war state prevails in the initial period, and the highest type then cannot prefer
a deviation in which it selects a higher price, sells nothing and restarts the war state in the
second period. This motivates our de￿nition of the worst carrot-stick scheme. As con￿rmed in
the Appendix, in a worst carrot-stick scheme, if a ￿rm begins the game with the highest type,
then it earns a payo￿, vcs(￿ ￿), that is positive in Model 1 and zero in Model 2. Intuitively, in
Model 1, if the payo￿ to such a ￿rm is too low, then this ￿rm would prefer to \sit out" for a
period and re-start the war state in the next period, when its type may be ￿ instead. We show
further that, in a worst carrot-stick scheme, the payo￿ to a ￿rm with cost type ￿i;t is
vcs(￿i;t) = vcs(￿ ￿) +











is the expected discounted unit cost for ￿rm i; given that
￿rm i currently has cost type ￿i;t.
Within the class of strategies characterized by pooling, payo￿s are clearly maximized when
the best rigid-pricing scheme is used. Thus, if ￿rms are su￿ciently patient to enforce the
best rigid-pricing scheme in a PPBE, then the resulting best rigid-pricing equilibrium is a best
pooling equilibrium. As is well known, it is easier to enforce an equilibrium when a more severe
punishment is employed following any deviation. We impose here that the punishment takes
the form of a worst carrot-stick equilibrium.10 The following result establishes the existence of a
critical discount factor above which a best (rigid-pricing) pooling equilibrium can be supported
by a worst carrot-stick pooling equilibrium.
Proposition 1. Consider either Model 1 or Model 2. Let ￿c ￿
(r￿￿)(I￿1)
(r￿￿)I￿(￿￿￿) 2 (I￿1
I ;1): For all
￿ 2 [￿c;1); there exists a worst carrot-stick equilibrium. Thus, a best rigid-pricing equilibrium
exists where following a deviation, ￿rms switch to a worst carrot-stick equilibrium.
Proof: See Appendix.
We observe that the critical discount factor is independent of the degree of persistence of
cost types. The proof shows that the critical discount factor is determined by the constraint
that a ￿rm with the lowest cost type, ￿; must not gain from deviating by undercutting the price
r in the reward state. This constraint re￿ects a tradeo￿ for such a ￿rm between the immediate
bene￿t from undercutting and thus serving the entire market and the future cost of triggering
the war state and thereby diminishing the continuation value. The cost outweighs the bene￿t
if the ￿rm is su￿ciently patient. Intuitively, the persistence of the ￿rm’s cost type enters by
a￿ecting the continuation values that it expects after cooperation and deviation, respectively.
But whether the ￿rm cooperates or deviates will not a￿ect its expected discounted unit cost
level, ￿￿. Furthermore, in a carrot-stick equilibrium, the market share that a ￿rm enjoys is
independent of whether the ￿rm deviated in the past. Thus, while a deviation reduces a ￿rm’s
expected future revenue, it does not alter the ￿rm’s expected future costs. Consequently, the
extent to which a deviation causes a diminishment in the continuation value is independent of
the degree of persistence in cost types.
Pooling equilibria are appealingly simple, in that both on and o￿ the equilibrium path, no
messages are sent and no new information about types is revealed. If initial beliefs are equal
to the prior, ￿rms’ beliefs about opponents remain ￿xed at the prior. Thus, a key feature of
our constructed pooling equilbria is that beliefs about opponents do not play an important
role. Carrot-stick equilibria can thus serve as punishments supporting other equilibria without
modi￿cation, even when information about types has been revealed.
10 In general, there will be more severe punishments than the worst carrot-stick scheme; in particular, punish-
ments with some separation of types will typically be worse. See Section 5 for an example.
133.2. The Optimality of Pooling Equilibria with Extreme Persistence
In this subsection, we establish that pooling is (approximately) optimal when the persistence of
cost shocks is (near-) perfect, if the prior distribution F0 is log-concave or if r is large enough.
We show that partial pooling may be optimal when these conditions are not satis￿ed.
3.2.1. Pooling Is Optimal with Perfect Persistence
We focus here on Model 2 and thus analyze the special case where ￿rm cost types are perfectly
persistent. In particular, we characterize the best collusive equilibrium from the perspective
of ￿rms at the beginning of the game, before they learn their cost types. As a punishment
equilibrium, we use the worst carrot-stick equilibrium of Proposition 1. Our main result is
robust to allowing for small probabilities that types change over time, and thus the result can
be thought of as a limiting case.
Recall now the distinction between on-schedule (unobservable) deviations and o￿-schedule
(observable) deviations. Under perfect persistence, mimicking one type throughout the entire
game is an on-schedule deviation, and any other deviation is an o￿-schedule deviation. This
is true because mimicking one type, and then another type, reveals that the ￿rm must have
misrepresented at one point, given that cost types do not change throughout the game.
The main result of this subsection establishes that the best rigid-pricing equilibrium de-
scribed in Proposition 1 is optimal ex ante under fairly mild parameter restrictions. To prove
this result, we proceed in two steps. First, we maximize ex ante ￿rm pro￿ts in a relaxed setting,
where we choose market share and revenue functions directly and require only that on-schedule
deviations are unattractive. When F0 is log-concave or r is large enough, we show that the op-
timal market share and revenue functions can be achieved when ￿rms use the best rigid-pricing
scheme. Second, we consider whether the solution in the relaxed setting is also immune to
o￿-schedule deviations. Here, we recall from Proposition 1 that the best rigid-pricing scheme
is actually immune to all deviations, including o￿-schedule deviations, when ￿ ￿ ￿c.
Proposition 2. Consider Model 2: Suppose that ￿ ￿ ￿c; for ￿c de￿ned in Proposition 1. Then,
if F0 is log-concave or if r is large enough, an (ex ante) optimal PPBE is the best rigid-pricing
equilibrium described in Proposition 1.
Proof: First, we maximize ex ante ￿rm pro￿ts in a relaxed setting, in which we choose mar-
ket share and revenue functions subject to the on-schedule incentive constraint. Let ￿ Ri(^ ￿i;1)
and ￿ Mi(^ ￿i;1) denote the expected future discounted revenues and market shares that ￿rm i
anticipates if it mimics type ^ ￿i;1 throughout the game. If ￿rm i’s type is ￿i;1; then the present
discounted value of pro￿ts for ￿rm i can be represented as Ui(^ ￿i;1;￿i;1) ￿ ￿ Ri(^ ￿i;1)￿￿i;1 ￿ Mi(^ ￿i;1):
The on-schedule incentive-compatibility constraint requires that, for all i,
Ui(￿i;1;￿i;1) ￿ Ui(^ ￿i;1;￿i;1) for all ^ ￿i;1;￿i;1: (3.1)
14By standard arguments, (3.1) holds only if
￿ Mi(￿i;1) is nonincreasing in ￿i;1 (3.2)
and (by the envelope theorem)
Ui(￿i;1;￿i;1) = Ui(￿;￿) +
Z ￿
e ￿i=￿i;1
￿ Mi(e ￿i)de ￿i: (3.3)
Using (3.3) and integration by parts, (3.1) implies that
E￿i;1 [Ui(￿i;1;￿i;1)jF0] = E￿i;1
￿









We now de￿ne the relaxed program: Choose a value ￿ Ri(￿) and a function ￿ Mi(￿i;1) to maxi-









￿ Ri(￿) ￿ r ￿ ￿ Mi(￿); (3.6)
where (3.5) is imposed since ￿rms (and strategies) are assumed ex ante symmetric11 and (3.6)
is imposed since type ￿ cannot sell its market share at a price higher than r: We emphasize that
the constraints of the relaxed program are substantially less restrictive than those that would
be imposed were we to maximize over strategies that form a PPBE.
If F0 is log-concave or if r is large enough, we may now use Proposition 5 of Athey, Bagwell




￿ Ri(￿) = r￿ ￿ Mi(￿): In particular, their result shows that among all functions ￿ Mi(￿i;1) that satisfy
(3.2) and (3.5), the last term of (3.4) is maximized when ￿ Mi(￿i;1) ￿ 1
1￿￿
1
I if F0 is log-concave.
The central idea is easily understood: log-concavity is equivalent to
F0(￿i;1)
f0(￿i;1) nondecreasing,
and so the last term of (3.4) is maximized when ￿ Mi puts as much weight as possible on high
realizations of ￿i;1; subject to the constraints that ￿ Mi is nonincreasing and must achieve a given
average value (i.e., subject to (3.2) and (3.5)). This is accomplished when ￿ Mi is constant in
￿i;1.12 Consider now the ￿rst term in (3.4). Observe that ￿ Ri(￿)￿￿￿ ￿ Mi(￿) ￿ [r￿￿] ￿ Mi(￿) ￿ r￿￿
(1￿￿)I;
where the ￿rst inequality follows from (3.6) and the second inequality follows from (3.2) and
11 If we allowed for ex ante asymmetric strategies (and thus market shares), we would need to modify the
arguments to require that total ex ante expected market share (across all ￿rms) is 1=(1￿￿); but we would allow
the ex ante expectations to di￿er across ￿rms. Given any vector of ￿rm-speci￿c ex ante expected market shares,
pooling will be optimal under the conditions stated in the proposition, except that the critical discount factor
must be increased due to the increased temptation of the disadvantaged ￿rm to cheat.
12 Formally, since
R ￿
￿ I(1￿￿)￿ ￿ Mi(￿i;1)￿f0(￿i;1)d￿i;1 =1, g(￿i;1; ￿ Mi) = I(1￿￿)￿ ￿ Mi(￿i;1)￿f0(￿i;1) is a probability
density. Since F0=f0 is nondecreasing, the expected value of F0=f0 with respect to g is increased if the associated
distribution G(￿i;1; ￿ Mi) is shifted by First-Order Stochastic Dominance (FOSD). But if M
r
i (￿i;1) ￿ 1=(I(1￿￿));
then G(￿i;1;M
r
i ) dominates (FOSD) G(￿i;1; ￿ Mi) for all valid market-share functions ￿ Mi(￿i;1).
15(3.5). Thus, the ￿rst term in (3.4) is maximized when ￿ Mi(￿) ￿ 1
1￿￿
1
I and ￿ Ri(￿) = r ￿ ￿ Mi(￿):
Likewise, if r is large enough, then the ￿rst term of (3.4) dominates the second, so that again
the maximum is achieved when ￿ Mi(￿) ￿ 1
1￿￿
1
I and ￿ Ri(￿) = r ￿ ￿ Mi(￿).
We now observe that the revenue value and market share function that solves the relaxed
program, in fact, can be achieved by strategies in the extensive form game. In particular, the







I; respectively, and so the solution to the relaxed program is achieved. We have already
established in Proposition 1 that when ￿ ￿ ￿c, the best rigid-pricing scheme is used in a PPBE
of the game. Thus, the best rigid-pricing equilibrium described in Proposition 1 must be an
optimal equilibrium, when ￿ ￿ ￿c and F0 is log-concave or r is large enough.
Before proceeding, we comment on the approach of the proof of Proposition 2. We considered
the solution to a relaxed problem, where strategies only needed to be immune to a restricted
class of deviations, whereby one cost type mimics another for all time. It was fortuitous that the
solution took such a simple form, and that the solution was immune to all types of deviations.13
A di￿erent solution to the relaxed problem might not have been an equilibrium to the original
game. Indeed, this situation occurs when we relax the parameter restrictions of Proposition 2,
as we show in Section 3.2.3.
It might seem that it would be advantageous for ￿rms to signal their cost types at the
beginning of the game and then enjoy the bene￿ts of collusion with complete information about
costs for the remainder of the game. However, Proposition 2 shows that such an equilibrium is
not optimal if ￿rms are su￿ciently patient. Part of the intuition follows from the fact that the
signaling costs must be proportional to the gains from signaling. If a low-cost ￿rm expects a
market-share advantage for the remainder of the game, it will be willing to expend great costs
signaling at the beginning. A more subtle intuition highlights the role of log-concavity of F0:
This is an important condition: as we con￿rm below in Section 3.2.3, if r is close to ￿ and F0
is not log-concave, the best rigid-pricing scheme may no longer be optimal. Log-concavity is
equivalent to requiring that F0
f0 (￿i;1) is nondecreasing. Giving more market share to higher-cost
types, as in a rigid-pricing scheme, allows lower-cost types to get higher utility in equilibrium,
without inducing mimicry from higher-cost types. The term F0
f0 (￿i;1) measures the magnitude
of this e￿ect. When it is higher for higher types, it is optimal to allocate more market share to
higher types, in spite of the resulting e￿ciency losses.
This result is closely related to a ￿nding of McAfee and McMillan (1992). They show that
in a static cartel, when no monetary transfers are allowed and there is no future to provide
incentives, the optimal mechanism for the cartel is a rigid-pricing strategy, if it can somehow
be enforced. Athey, Bagwell, and Sanchirico (2004) provide a similar result in a repeated game
model of a self-enforcing cartel, where costs are i.i.d. over time. In that context, non-stationary
13 Indeed, we have proved something stronger than stated in the proposition: rigid pricing is optimal among
all Bayesian Nash equilibria that are immune only to deviations from on-path histories.
16equilibria are possible, and the prospect of a reduced continuation value may thus deter a
high-cost type from mimicking a low-cost type. Athey, Bagwell, and Sanchirico (2004) focus on
equilibria that are strongly symmetric, however, and so any use of future continuation values
to provide incentives is necessarily wasteful from the perspective of the cartel, as it must take
the form of an industry-wide price war. The availability of an industry-wide price war would
correspond to a limited form of transfers in a static model. In this context, they ￿nd that the
optimal equilibrium does not use industry-wide price wars to provide incentives. Instead, the
best rigid-pricing scheme is optimal.
In the context of collusion with perfectly persistent cost types, Proposition 2 shows that the
best rigid-pricing scheme is also optimal. Importantly, we obtain this result while allowing for
asymmetric (and non-stationary) equilibria; in particular, utility can be transferred from one
￿rm to another through future play (as well as \wasted" through industry-wide price wars).
However, because cost types do not change over time, if a low-type ￿rm transfers utility to a
high-type ￿rm by giving up future market share, this transfer must be ine￿cient. This contrasts
with the ￿rst-best result presented in Athey and Bagwell (2001), who study a model where cost
types are discrete and i.i.d. over time, and asymmetric equilibria are allowed. It is then possible
for a ￿rm that has low costs today to make an e￿cient future transfer to a ￿rm that has high
costs today. The ￿rms achieve an e￿cient future transfer by waiting for a date in which they
have the same cost type.
Our result is also related to a well-known ￿nding (see, e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991,
pp. 299-301) in the dynamic contracting literature. This ￿nding states that, in a dynamic
principal-agent model with persistent types, if the principal has commitment power, then it is
impossible for the principal to improve upon a mechanism that replicates the optimal static
mechanism in each period. Under the assumptions of log-concavity and su￿cient patience,
we also ￿nd that the optimal dynamic solution entails the repeated play of the optimal static
solution. Despite this apparent similarity, our analysis di￿ers in several respects. There is no
\principal" in our model who commits to allocations and transfers as a function of reports.
Indeed we analyze schemes that are optimal from the ex ante perspective of \agents" (i.e.,
￿rms). While the principal-agent model allows monetary transfers to \settle up" transfers of
utility immediately, we assume that direct sidepayments between ￿rms are infeasible, and so
state-contingent transfers of utility may need to be implemented through subsequent play, play
that must respect incentive constraints given current information. In other words, in the PPBE
of our dynamic game, agents cannot make commitments with respect to their future behavior.
In Section 3.2.3, we analyze an example in which log concavity fails and ￿nd that, even if agents
are very patient, the optimal mechanism with commitment cannot be achieved as a PPBE of
the dynamic game.
Our result that the best rigid-pricing scheme is optimal builds from two key assumptions:
inelastic demand and linear costs. We now discuss how the results change when these assump-
17tions are relaxed. First, we note that rigid pricing has two important features. First, the
allocation of market share is ine￿cient. Second, there is pooling: all types receive the same
outcomes. We argue that some productive ine￿ciency is a robust feature of our model but that
full pooling is not. Yet, pooling is not a knife-edge result: it strictly dominates the alternatives
in our baseline model; and for cost functions and demand speci￿cations su￿ciently close to our
baseline model, pooling remains optimal.
First, consider variations on the speci￿cation of demand. In the supplementary material, we
brie￿y analyze models in which (i) products are perfect substitutes but demand is downward-
sloping, (ii) products are imperfect substitutes, and (iii) ￿rms compete in quantities. In case
(i), we show that when demand is su￿ciently inelastic, the best rigid-pricing scheme is still
optimal. In general, forces in favor of at least partial pooling remain present in all of the
alternative models.
Second, consider costs that are nonlinear in output. Variation in market share for a given
cost type can then either increase or decrease expected costs, depending on whether the cost
function is concave or convex. In addition, it is possible that a ￿rm’s expected market share
can be non-monotonic in its cost type without violating incentive compatibility, since not only
the mean but also the variance of the market share for a particular cost type a￿ect payo￿s
for that type. Despite these complications, we show in the supplementary material that when
costs are concave in output, a best rigid-pricing equilibrium o￿ers strictly higher payo￿s than
any equilibrium in which the highest-cost type receives less than 1=I market share in each
period (the market share under rigid pricing). However, we have not ruled out the (seemingly
pathological) possibility that pro￿ts can be increased by resorting to an even more extreme form
of ine￿ciency with some separation of types, where the highest-cost type gets even greater than
average market share.
3.2.2. Pooling Is Approximately Optimal with Near-Perfect Persistence
Our next result shows that the best pooling equilibrium is approximately optimal in Model
1, when persistence gets high enough. This con￿rms that the result of Proposition 2 can be
taken as a limiting case. As mentioned in the Introduction, incentives as well as the possible
evolution of beliefs may be distinctly di￿erent in models where types are ￿xed with probability
1 and models where types can change with positive probability. However, in pooling equilibria,
these distinctions are less important.
To establish our limiting result, we consider a sequence f￿n
L;￿n
Hg such that limn!1f￿n
L;￿n
Hg =
f1;0g; and such that Fn
0 = F0; where Fn
0 is the prior (stationary) distribution given f￿n
L;￿n
Hg:
Although our proof does not make use of the particular form of the sequence, for concreteness
we de￿ne
￿n
L = 1 ￿ (1 ￿ F0(￿))=n; ￿n
H = F0(￿)=n: (3.7)
18Corollary 1. Consider Model 1: Fix ￿ > ￿c. Let the sequence f￿n
L;￿n
Hg be de￿ned in (3.7). If
(r￿ ￿ ￿)=(￿ ￿￿￿)> 1￿F0(￿); then the limit as n ! 1 of the payo￿ achieved by a given ￿rm in the
optimal ex ante PPBE approaches 1
I(1￿￿)(r ￿ E￿i;1 [￿i;1jF0]); which is also the payo￿ attained
by the best rigid-pricing scheme given F0 and perfectly persistent types.
Proof: See Appendix.
This result can be understood in two parts. First, the parameter restriction implies that
pooling is optimal when types are perfectly persistent, so that the analog of Proposition 2
holds for a two-type model. Second, we show that payo￿s are upper hemi-continuous in the
persistence parameter.
3.2.3. Partial Pooling May Be Optimal when Log-Concavity Fails
So far, we have focused on the case where the prior distribution F0 is log-concave or r is large
enough. We now consider how the analysis would change if these conditions fail. In that event,
it is direct to show that in a static mechanism design problem, or in a repeated game with cost
types that are i.i.d. over time, the optimal scheme typically entails partial pooling. However, a
number of subtleties arise when analyzing the repeated game with perfectly persistent types.
To focus our discussion, consider a prior distribution with the following properties: there
exists z 2 (￿; ￿ ￿) such that F0(￿i;1)=f0(￿i;1) is strictly increasing on [￿;z) and on (z; ￿ ￿]; but
F0(￿i;1)=f0(￿i;1) decreases discretely at z. A speci￿c example follows (where z = 2=3):
Example 1: The distribution is piecewise uniform and described by the following density func-
tion: f0(￿i;1) = ￿1 for ￿i;1 2 [0;1=3); f0(￿i;1) = ￿2 for ￿i;1 2 [1=3;2=3); and f0(￿i;1) = 3￿￿1￿￿2
for ￿i;1 2 [2=3;1]; and f0(￿i;1) = 0 elsewhere, where 0 < ￿1 + ￿2 < 3. If ￿2 is small enough,
F0(￿i;1)
f0(￿i;1) will jump up at 1=3 and then jump down at 2=3:
As a benchmark, let us begin by considering the optimal collusive scheme subject only to
the on-schedule incentive constraints in the ￿rst period. (Recall that we took this approach in
the proof of Proposition 2.) We can use similar arguments to Proposition 2 to show that the
scheme which maximizes E￿i;1 [Ui(￿i;1;￿i;1)jF0] subject to the ￿rst-period on-schedule incentive
constraints is characterized by pooling within each of the intervals [￿;z) and [z; ￿ ￿]; since F0 is log-
concave within those intervals. Consider now the comparison between two possible schemes:
one with pooling throughout [￿; ￿ ￿] (speci￿cally, the best rigid-pricing scheme); and one with
pooling within each interval [￿;z) and [z; ￿ ￿]; but separation between the two steps.
The following class of schemes has separation between two steps. How much the market
shares di￿er for the two regions of types is a parameter of the scheme.
Two-Step Scheme: A set of strategies where, on and o￿ of the equilibrium path, announce-
ments are uninformative. We may then suppress notation and represent the pricing strategy
19within a period as ￿i;t(￿i;1): For ￿i;1 2 [￿;z); ￿i;1(￿i;1) = pL and ￿i;t(￿i;1) = r for all t > 1, while
for ￿i;1 2 [z; ￿ ￿]; ￿i;t(￿i;1) = r for all t. In period 1, each player makes the (nonbinding) quantity
restriction qi;t = 1, so that the market share allocation is 1/I if all choose the same price, and
otherwise the low-price ￿rms serve the market. If N ￿rms tied for the lowest price in period 1,
then in all subsequent periods each of these N ￿rms sets qi;t = (1￿(I￿N)k)=N, while all other
￿rms set qi;t = k; where k 2 [0;1=I). Any o￿-schedule deviation results in a switch to the worst
carrot-stick scheme analyzed in Proposition 1. The price pL is determined by the on-schedule
incentive constraint in the ￿rst period, and so it will depend on k; for simplicity, we allow that
pL may be negative.
Simple Two-Step Scheme: A Two-Step Scheme with k = 0:
We show below that the simple two-step scheme does not satisfy all relevant o￿-schedule
incentive constraints, but we begin by analyzing it as a benchmark. To compare the best rigid-
pricing scheme with the simple two-step scheme, let y be the expected discounted market share
for types on [￿;z): Using (3.4), ex ante expected pro￿ts as a function of y are





























Then, when (3.8) holds, pro￿ts will be strictly higher with the simple two-step scheme, which
gives greater market share to types on [￿;z):
Example 1, cont.: Condition (3.8) holds if ￿1;￿2 2 (0;3); and
￿1 > (￿1 + ￿2)
(9(r ￿ 1) + ￿1 + ￿2)
3 ￿ (￿1 + ￿2)
:
This requires that 4=3 > r and ￿1 + ￿2 < (3 ￿ 9(r ￿ 1))=2: If r = 1:2 and ￿1 + ￿2 = 1=5; (3.8)
holds if 1=5 > ￿1 > 1=7:
So, when (3.8) holds, the simple two-step scheme would dominate the best rigid-pricing
scheme, if the simple two-step scheme were a PPBE. But it is not. To see why, suppose ￿1;1 < z
and ￿ ￿ > ￿2;1 > z: Starting in the second period, ￿rm 2 makes 0 pro￿t under the simple two-step
scheme. As ￿rm 2 makes positive pro￿t under the worst carrot-stick equilibrium, it would make
an o￿-schedule deviation (e.g., undercutting r in period 2) and trigger the punishment.
We can salvage an equilibrium with partial pooling, however, by specifying that ￿rms 1
and 2 share the market, unequally, after period 1. We de￿ne Mcs(￿i;t) as the minimum market
20share that a ￿rm must receive to deter an o￿-schedule deviation in periods t > 1 when ￿rms
price at r: This must satisfy
Mcs(￿i;t)
(1 ￿ ￿)





(￿ ￿ ￿ ￿i;t);
where the second equality follows since, in Model 2, vcs(￿ ￿) = 0 and ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿i;t = ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿i;t: For all
￿i;t 2 [￿; ￿ ￿], it is straightforward to verify that Mcs(￿i;t) is decreasing, and that Mcs(￿i;t) ￿ 1=I
if also ￿ 2 [￿c;1). Recall that the worst carrot-stick equilibrium can be supported over this
discount-factor interval. Now, consider the following modi￿cation of the simple two-step scheme.
Market-Sharing Two-Step Scheme: A two-step scheme with k = Mcs(z):
The price pL is determined by the on-schedule incentive constraint in the ￿rst period, and so
it will take on a di￿erent value than in the simple two-step scheme.
By construction, the market-sharing two-step scheme satis￿es on-schedule constraints in
period 1. After period 1, strategies specify behavior as a function of ￿rst-period observed
behavior, and there are no additional on-schedule constraints. Since Mcs(￿i;1) ￿ 1=I; all ￿rms
receive market share greater than or equal to Mcs(￿i;1); and so o￿-schedule constraints are
satis￿ed for all ￿rms in periods t > 1: It remains only to consider the o￿-schedule constraints
in period 1.
Proposition 3. Consider Model 2.
(i) For all ￿ 2 [￿c;1); there exists a market-sharing two-step equilibrium.
(ii) If (3.8) holds, the market-sharing two-step equilibrium yields greater ex ante expected
pro￿ts than the best rigid-pricing equilibrium.
Proof: See Appendix.
The ￿rst part of this result shows that the market-sharing two-step equilibrium exists when-
ever the best rigid-pricing equilibrium exists (￿ ￿ ￿c). To establish that no additional patience
is required to support the market-sharing two-step scheme, we show that it is the lowest-cost
type who is most tempted to deviate from the best rigid-pricing scheme. With the two-step
scheme, low-cost types expect to receive greater market share in the ￿rst period, and so gain
less from undercutting either their assigned price (pL) or the price assigned to higher-cost types
(r):14 The second part of Proposition 3 shows that it is possible to improve upon the best-rigid
pricing scheme, when r is not too large and F0 is not log-concave. We have not, however, proved
that the market-sharing two-step equilibrium is optimal. A scheme with multiple steps would
achieve further separation of types in the ￿rst period and thereby allocate lower market share
14 Thus, if a punishment were available that required less patience to implement than the worst carrot-stick
equilibrium; it would be possible to support the market-sharing two-step scheme with a lower range of discount
factors than that required to support the best rigid-pricing scheme. As de￿ned, however, the market-sharing
two-step scheme relies on the worst carrot-stick equilibrium, and we require ￿ ￿ ￿c for that equilibrium to exist.
21to the higher cost types in future periods. The e￿ect of addtional steps on ex ante expected
pro￿t, however, is sensitive to the precise way in which F0 fails to be log-concave.
Before proceeding, we pause to interpret the market-sharing two-step equilibrium. In this
equilibrium, there is an initial signalling phase, where some ￿rms set low prices (and thus receive
a higher market share than the remaining ￿rms). In all subsequent periods, ￿rms that initially
cut prices receive more market share than those who did not, but all ￿rms have some market
share. Notice that empirically, this behavior might appear to entail an initial \price war"
followed by a \collusive phase," where the market shares during the price war phase determine
the market shares of the \collusive phase." Roos (2003) argues that a price war in the lysine
industry started by Archer Daniels Midland in the early 1990s had these characteristics.
4. Equilibria with Some Productive E￿ciency
In this section, we study equilibria with at least some productive e￿ciency. First, we establish
that when ￿rms are su￿ciently patient, there exist simple equilibria with partial productive
e￿ciency and pricing at r. However, as persistence of types grows, the degree of productive
e￿ciency approaches zero, even if ￿rms are very patient. Second, we construct more sophis-
ticated equilibria with productive e￿ciency and pricing at r on the equilibrium path. These
￿rst-best equilibria exist when ￿rms are patient relative to the persistence of cost types.
4.1. Partial Productive E￿ciency with Arbitrary Persistence
Consider Model 1. We show that so long as ￿ is greater than ￿c; the critical discount factor
for supporting the best rigid-pricing equilibrium, it is possible to improve upon the best rigid-
pricing equilibrium. To accomplish this, we introduce a simple odd-even scheme, whereby ￿rms
report their types in odd periods and implement partial productive e￿ciency. In even periods,
the ￿rms that received higher market share in the prior period must reduce their market share.
The even-period market shares are determined so as to provide incentives for truthful revelation
in the odd periods.
Odd-Even Scheme: A set of strategies described as follows. Consider two functions, the
odd-period market share allocation function ￿o
i : A ! [0;1], and the even-period market share
allocation function ￿e
i : A ! [0;1], where
P
i ￿o
i(at) = 1 and
P
i ￿e
i(at) = 1 for all at 2 A: If t is
an odd period, ￿rms announce their cost types, so that at = ￿t: Then, the ￿rms choose pi;t = r;
but they share the market unequally, as determined by qi;t = ￿o
i(at). In period t + 1; an even
period, announcements are uninformative. All ￿rms choose pi;t+1 = r; and qi;t+1 = ￿e
i(at): In
all periods, any o￿-schedule deviation is punished by switching to a worst carrot-stick scheme.
In the Appendix proof of Proposition 4, we formally de￿ne a value function for an odd-even
equilibrium, as well as the on- and o￿-schedule constraints. Here, we provide some intuition
22about the role of the constraints and when they will bind, focusing for simplicity on the case
where I = 2. In an on-schedule deviation, a ￿rm that just observed its cost type ￿i;t in odd
period t mimics type ^ ￿i;t throughout periods t and t+1 (since the strategies call for uninformative
announcements in period t + 1). If low-cost types receive more market share in odd periods
(￿o
i(L;H) > 1=2), the binding on-schedule incentive constraint will be the constraint that
deters a high-cost type from mimicking a low-cost type in an odd period. This deviation will
be deterred if ￿e
i(L;H) is su￿ciently low and ￿e
i(H;L) is su￿ciently high. The most tempting
o￿-schedule deviation has a ￿rm undercut the collusive price of r. Such a deviation may be
tempting in either an odd period or an even period; in an even period t + 1, such a deviation
yields a short-term gain of (1￿￿e
i(￿i;t;￿j;t))(r￿￿i;t+1): The even-period o￿-schedule constraint
is especially likely to bind if (￿i;t;￿j;t) = (L;H) and ￿i;t+1 = L, since (in order to respect the
on-schedule constraints when ￿o
i(L;H) > 1=2) we will have ￿e
i(L;H) < 1=2:
For ￿ > ￿c; we now establish that an odd-even equilibrium can be constructed that achieves
a strictly higher ex ante payo￿ for ￿rms than does the best rigid-pricing equilibrium. An
attractive feature of the constructed scheme is that the on-schedule incentive constraints are
satis￿ed pointwise (so that announcing truthfully is ex post incentive compatible); thus, the
speci￿c manner in which beliefs are formed about the evolution of rivals’ costs is unimportant.
The proof builds from two insights. First, starting from the best rigid-pricing equilibrium, it is
possible to maintain on-schedule incentive compatibility and raise the ex ante payo￿ for ￿rms,
by making an intertemporal exchange in market shares under which a ￿rm that reveals itself
to have low (high) costs in the odd period experiences an increase (decrease) in its odd-period
market share and a decrease (increase) in its market share in the subsequent even period.
Intuitively, market share is then redistributed from known high-cost ￿rms to a known low-cost
￿rm in the odd period, while in the subsequent period market share is redistributed from a ￿rm
that, under imperfect persistence, probably has low costs to ￿rms that probably have high costs.
Second, when the intertemporal exchange in market shares is small, the o￿-schedule constraints
are sure to be satis￿ed provided that ￿ > ￿c; so that these constraints are slack under the best
rigid-pricing equilibrium. This follows since the odd-even value function is continuous in the
market shares and the odd-even equilibrium is identical to the best rigid-pricing equilibrium
in the limit, when ￿e
i(at) = ￿o
i(at) = 1=I for all at: For some parameter values (e.g. when
persistence is low), the improvement in the future value of cooperation attained by increasing
productive e￿ciency relaxes the o￿-schedule constraints enough so that large intertemporal
exchanges of market share become possible even at ￿ = ￿c.
Proposition 4. Consider Model 1. If ￿ > ￿c; then there exists an odd-even equilibrium, where
this equilibrium achieves strictly higher ex ante payo￿s than the best rigid-pricing equilibrium.
Proof: See Appendix.
We next consider optimal equilibria within the odd-even class. For given parameter val-
23ues, the market share choices that maximize ex ante expected pro￿ts in the class of odd-even
equilibria can be computed using standard linear programming techniques.
Example 2: Suppose that I = 2; ￿L = :95; ￿H = :025; L = 1; H = 2, r = 2:1; and ￿ =
￿c + :001 = :918: Then, the odd-even equilibrium that maximizes ex ante expected pro￿ts uses
the following values: ￿o
i(L;L) = ￿o
i(H;H) = :5; ￿o
1(L;H) = 1 ￿ ￿o
1(H;L) = :59; ￿e
i(L;L) =
￿e
i(H;H) = :5; and ￿e
1(L;H) = 1 ￿ ￿e
1(H;L) = :42: The downward on-schedule constraint
(whereby type H is tempted to mimic L) is binding in all odd periods t. If t is odd and ￿t =
(L;H); ￿rm 1’s market share is .59 in period t and .42 in period t+1: The o￿-schedule constraint
limits productive e￿ciency: to increase ￿o
1(L;H); a decrease in ￿e
1(L;H) is required to respect
on-schedule constraints, but the o￿-schedule constraint for ￿rm 1’s low type in even periods
prevents a large decrease.
Even though market shares ￿uctuate in the odd-even equilibrium of Example 2, very little
e￿ciency is gained. Although production is fairly e￿cient in each odd period, production is
fairly ine￿cient in even periods. With persistent types, a realization of (L;H) is often followed
by another realization of (L;H): In the even period, the low-cost ￿rm then serves less than half
of the market. Indeed, using the prior distribution of costs, the average cost over an average
two-period cycle is 1.663, just slightly below the average cost in a pooling equilibrium of 1.667,
and far above the prior expected value of the minimum of the two ￿rms’ costs, 1.444.
Numerical calculations con￿rm that for more moderate persistence than Example 2, o￿-
schedule constraints are typically slack at ￿ = ￿c; and there is productive e￿ciency in odd
periods. However, even periods have substantial ine￿ciency.
The odd-even scheme has very limited history-dependence on the equilibrium path. That
limitation may be quite important. To gain some intuition, let us modify the odd-even scheme
to allow ￿e
1 to depend on at￿2 as well as at:
Example 3: Consider the parameter values of Example 2: Then, the (modi￿ed) odd-even equi-
librium that maximizes ex ante expected pro￿ts has ￿o
i(L;L) = ￿o
i(H;H) = :5;￿o
1(L;H) = 1 ￿
￿o
1(H;L) = 1: That is, there is productive e￿ciency in odd periods. The values of ￿e
i(￿1;￿2;at￿2)
in even periods are given in the following table:







(L;L) .5 .501 .5 .499
(L;H) .205 .117 0 0
(H;L) .795 1 1 .882
(H;H) .5 .622 .5 .378
The market shares in even periods are set to maximize productive e￿ciency while still respecting
24the on-schedule incentive constraints, which bind in odd periods. Suppose that t￿2 is odd, and
that at￿2 = (L;H), in which case ￿rm 1 serves the entire market in period t ￿ 2. Firm 1 must
receive reduced market share in a period following t ￿ 2 in order to respect the on-schedule in-
centive constraint. However, it is likely that ￿rm 1 will also be low cost in period t￿1: In order
to keep market share for ￿rm 1 as high as possible in period t￿1, it is useful to put o￿ some of
the \punishment" of ￿rm 1 to a future period. We see from Table 1 that ￿e
i(L;L;L;H) is equal
to .205. Given that ￿t = (L;L); there is no expected e￿ciency loss in the even period t + 1
from reducing market share for ￿rm 1. But, this low market share helps relax the on-schedule
incentive constraint for ￿rm 1 in period t ￿ 2:
In the equilibrium of Example 3, expected cost is 1.62, 2.6% lower than in Example 2.
However, the low productive e￿ciency in even periods still limits the productive e￿ciency of
the mechanism. Even when ￿ approaches 1, the average cost never gets lower than 1.588. The
example illustrates how greater history-dependence can help: incentives for ￿rm 1 to admit high
cost in period t ￿ 2 are provided by granting additional market share to ￿rm 1 in period t + 1;
in the event that both ￿rms have the same cost in period t:
More generally, numerical calculations con￿rm the following regularities. For any level of
persistence, there is an upper bound on the e￿ciency gain from the odd-even scheme. As the
persistence of cost types grows, this upper bound approaches zero.
4.2. First-Best with Moderate Persistence
In this subsection, we focus on Model 1 with two ￿rms (I = 2) and show that it is possible
to attain ￿rst-best collusion for some parameter values (values where patience is high relative
to persistence). The collusive scheme that delivers these payo￿s is referred to as a ￿rst-best
scheme and is a generalization of that proposed by Athey and Bagwell (2001). In each period,
￿rms announce their cost types. If one ￿rm has high cost and the other has low cost, the low-
cost ￿rm serves the market. If both have the same cost, the ￿rms split the market, typically
unevenly, where the splits are a function of past reports and are constructed to favor ￿rms who
have announced high costs in the past.
First-Best Scheme: A set of strategies in which, along the equilibrium path, ￿rms announce
their cost types and price at r in each period, so that at = ￿t and pi;t = r. Further, quantity
restrictions satisfy productive e￿ciency: if ai;t = L and aj;t = H; then qi;t = 1 and qj;t = 0: In
all periods, any o￿-schedule deviation is punished by switching to the worst carrot-stick scheme.
It remains to specify qt when ai;t = aj;t as a function of history. On the equilibrium path, play
depends on at￿1 as well as which of the two ￿rms is \favored." We represent this using \states,"
!1(￿t￿1) and !2(￿t￿1); where ￿rm 1 prefers !1(￿t￿1) to !2(￿t￿1): Let the set of states that
may be reached on the equilibrium path be denoted
￿e = f!1(L;L);!2(L;L);!1(L;H);!2(L;H);!1(H;L);!2(H;L);!1(H;H);!2(H;H)g:
25For each state !j(￿t￿1); we de￿ne period strategies and transitions to subsequent states as a
function of observables. Formally, let ￿ ￿ ￿2
i and
~ q1(￿;j;￿t￿1) : ￿ ! [0;1] and ~ g(￿;j;￿t￿1) : ￿ ! [0;1]; (4.1)
so in state !j(￿t￿1), following announcements ￿t; ￿rm 1 gets market share ~ q1(￿t;j;￿t￿1); ￿rm 2
gets market share 1￿~ q1(￿t;j;￿t￿1); and they subsequently move to state !1(￿t) with probability
~ g(￿t;j;￿t￿1) and to state !2(￿t) with probability 1 ￿ ~ g(￿t;j;￿t￿1):
For concreteness, consider the following example.
Example 4: Let r = 2:1;H = 2;L = 1;￿L = :7;￿H = :5 and ￿ = :92 > ￿c = :917: Using
the representation just described, the following table can be used to construct strategies for a
￿rst-best scheme.
Table 2: First-Best Scheme Description
~ q1(￿t;j;￿t￿1) ~ g(￿t;j;￿t￿1)
Today’s cost: ￿t (L;L) (L;H) (H;L) (H;H) (L;L) (L;H) (H;L) (H;H)
State: (j;￿t￿1)
(1;L;L) .5 1 0 1 0 0 1 .5
(2;L;L) .5 1 0 0 1 0 1 .5
(1;H;L) 1 1 0 .5 .5 0 1 .5
(2;L;H) 0 1 0 .5 .5 0 1 .5
(1;H;H) .5 1 0 1 .5 0 1 .5
(2;H;H) .5 1 0 0 .5 0 1 .5
The entries in the table incorporate productive e￿ciency: in every state, ~ q1(L;H;j;￿t￿1) = 1￿
~ q1(H;L;j;￿t￿1) = 1. The entry ~ g(￿t;j;￿t￿1) = 0 speci￿es that following ￿t = (L;H); the ￿rms
transition to state !2(L;H) (the state that favors ￿rm 2) with probability 1. Similarly, following
￿t = (H;L); the ￿rms transition to the state that favors ￿rm 1, !1(H;L); with probability 1.
The transitions following \ties" (￿t = (L;L) or ￿t = (H;H)) favor each ￿rm equally in each
state. In some states, market shares in the case of \ties" are unequal: the favored ￿rm receives
more market share. Note the states !1(L;H) and !2(H;L) are not used.
An interesting feature of this example is that communication and binding quantity con-
straints are not necessary to implement the ￿rst-best scheme. The market share divisions can
be accomplished by judicious choices of prices. For example, in state (1;L;L); ￿rm 1’s high-
cost type prices at r ￿ " and its low-cost type prices at r ￿ 2"; while ￿rm 2’s high-cost type
prices at r and its low-cost type prices at r ￿ 2": However, in general, the set of parameters
for which ￿rst-best equilibria exist is smaller when communication and quantity constraints are
not available, since eliminating these instruments places additional constraints on the scheme.
26How does one verify that a ￿rst-best scheme is in fact a PPBE? In a repeated game, the
dynamic programming tools of Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1986, 1990) can be applied to
construct \self-generating" sets of equilibrium values. In the supplementary material for this
article, we describe this in detail. Here, we show that it is possible to verify whether a ￿rst-best
scheme is a PPBE by solving a system of linear equations that de￿ne a ￿rm’s value in each
state as a function of its cost type, and then checking appropriately de￿ned on-schedule and
o￿-schedule incentive constraints.
The ￿rst step is to construct extensive form strategies that specify play following any public
history. Given an initial state, we can determine the state of the game following any history
(where the history includes the outcome of public randomization) simply by tracking through
the transitions speci￿ed by the strategies. If following a particular history the state is deter-
mined to be !j(￿t￿1) 2 ￿e, period strategies are given by
(￿i;t(￿i;t);￿i;t(at;￿i;t); i;t(at;￿i;t)) = (￿i;t;r; ~ qi(at;j;￿t￿1)) ￿ ~ si(at;￿i;t;j;￿t￿1):
(4.2)
Following every history up to time t, if announcements in period t are given by at; beliefs in
period t + 1 are given by F(￿;at).15
Let V be the set of functions v =(v1;::;vI) such that vi : ￿i ! R: This is the set of possible
\type-contingent payo￿ functions," specifying payo￿s to each ￿rm as a function of its true type
in a particular period. If V maps from Z to V, we can interpret Vi as an analog of a continuation
value function, but one that maps from today’s public outcomes to a vector of future values,
one for each type that ￿rm i could be in the next period. Given such a Vi; and given beliefs
about opponents ￿t and posited strategies st, the following represents ￿rm i’s expected payo￿s
in period t, before announcements are made, when ￿rm i has type ￿i;t and mimics type ^ ￿i;t :












The motivation for considering type-contingent payo￿ functions becomes clear when we see that
future values depend on today’s \reported type" ^ ￿i;t through the induced public actions that
serve to select a continuation equilibrium; while ￿rm i constructs its beliefs about the future
distribution of ￿i;t+1 based on its true type.
We now de￿ne two functions, ~ v 2V and ~ V mapping from Z to V, through the following
15 If a player makes an announcement that is not in ￿i; the players proceed to the carrot-stick equilibrium
where beliefs are forever after irrelevant, and so without loss of generality we can let the beliefs be as if the
deviant player announced ￿i;t = L. Given this, we simplify the discussion by focusing on the case where only
announcements in ￿i are possible for player i.
27system of equations for each ￿rm i.
For all (j;￿t￿1) 2 f1;2g ￿ ￿ : (4.3)
~ Vi(at;pt;qt;j;￿t￿1) = ~ g(at;j;￿t￿1) ~ vi(￿;1;at) + (1 ￿ ~ g(at;j;￿t￿1))~ vi(￿;2;at)
whenever at 2 ￿; pt = (r;r); and qt = ~ qt(^ ￿t;j;￿t￿1);
and ~ Vi(at;pt;qt;j;￿t￿1) = vcs otherwise, where
~ vi(￿i;t;j;￿t￿1) = ￿ ui(￿i;t;￿i;t;s;￿￿i;Vi)
with s = ~ s(￿;j;￿t￿1); ￿￿i = F(￿;￿￿i;t￿1); Vi = ~ Vi(￿;j;￿t￿1):
Standard arguments (e.g. Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1986)) can be used to verify that, if
we consider a particular !j(￿) 2 ￿e, if initial beliefs are F(￿;￿) and extensive-form strategies
and beliefs are speci￿ed using the construction outlined above, ~ vi(￿0
i;j;￿) is indeed the expected
discounted future payo￿ that player i expects after observing type ￿0
i:
It remains to specify incentive constraints that ensure that a set of strategies are best
responses given beliefs following every history. We have already veri￿ed that starting from any
initial beliefs, the carrot-stick strategy pro￿les form a PPBE for discount factors above a critical
level, so we focus on !j(￿) 2 ￿e: It is straightforward to verify that some types of deviations
are dominated. For example, announcing a type outside of ￿i is dominated by a deviation with
an announcement in ￿i followed by a price of r ￿ ": This deviation also dominates deviations
involving quantity restrictions or lower prices. The following constraint guarantees that all
o￿-schedule deviations are deterred for ￿rm i in state !j(￿t￿1) 2 ￿e:
~ vi(￿i;t;j;￿t￿1) ￿ r ￿ ￿i;t + ￿vcs: (4.4)
On-schedule deviations are deterred for ￿rm i in state !j(￿t￿1) 2 ￿e if
8 ￿i;t; ^ ￿i;t; ~ vi(￿i;t;j;￿t￿1) ￿ ￿ ui(^ ￿i;t;￿i;t;~ s(￿;j;￿t￿1);F(￿;￿￿i;t￿1); ~ Vi(￿;j;￿t￿1)):
(4.5)
Note that initial beliefs at the start of the game may not be among those in the ￿rst-best
scheme (f￿ : ￿ = F(￿;￿t) for some ￿tg). The scheme can be augmented to allow for initial
beliefs, but we do not introduce notation for that here.
Summarizing this analysis, we have
Proposition 5. Fix I = 2 and consider the two-type model with imperfect persistence, with
primitives ￿;r;L;H; and F, with ￿ ￿ ￿c. Fix the speci￿cation of a ￿rst-best scheme ~ g and ~ q1;
and de￿ne the corresponding ~ s and ~ V as in (4.2) and (4.3). If for each (i;j;￿t￿1) 2 f1;2g2￿￿,
the on-schedule and o￿-schedule constraints, (4.5) and (4.4), hold; then this ￿rst-best scheme
is a PPBE set that yields ￿rst-best pro￿ts in every period.
28Proposition 5 can be applied to Example 4. It identi￿es the incentive constraints that can
be checked to guarantee that a ￿rst-best scheme is a PPBE. However, the result does not
give any indication of whether, for a given set of primitives, there will exist a speci￿cation
for (4.1) that can satisfy the incentive constraints. It turns out that it is cumbersome to
give necessary and su￿cient conditions for speci￿cations such that the ￿rst-best equilibrium
exists, since that exercise involves searching over a large-dimensional space. However, we have
constructed examples with a wide range of speci￿ations; a general theme, not surprisingly, is
that patience needs to be large relative to persistence.
5. Productive E￿ciency with Perfect Persistence
As discussed in the last section, when patience is high relative to persistence, it may be possible
to construct a ￿rst-best equilibrium. We showed in Section 3 that when persistence is extreme,
pooling is optimal or approximately optimal so long as the distribution of cost types is log-
concave. In this section, we ask whether equilibria with productive e￿ciency exist at all when
cost types are perfectly persistent. We show that even if we allow for low prices, productive
e￿ciency requires that patience be low enough. In addition, the equilibrium we construct
requires a severe form of punishment in the case of o￿-schedule deviations.
5.1. Separating Equilibria with Productive E￿ciency
We analyze here Model 2. Any proposed equilibrium with productive e￿ciency in each period
must be immune to deviations whereby one type mimics another type in every period. This
incentive compatibility requirement in turn implies
Ui(￿i;1;￿i;1) = Ui(￿;￿) +
Z ￿
e ￿i=￿i;1





(1 ￿ F0(e ￿i))I￿1de ￿i;
(5.1)
following the logic and using the notation from the proof of Proposition 2. That is, each
player must expect per-period pro￿ts equal to those of the static Nash equilibrium. Thus, an
equilibrium with productive e￿ciency would not be very pro￿table. Indeed, it can be shown
that if (￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)=I ￿
R ￿ ￿
￿ (1 ￿ F(~ ￿))I￿1d~ ￿; then all types other than ￿ would earn strictly less in
an equilibrium with productive e￿ciency than in the worst carrot-stick equilibrium.16
However, it remains to analyze whether an equilibrium exists that delivers productive ef-
￿ciency. The static Nash equilibrium is no longer an equilibrium in the dynamic game, since
beliefs change after ￿rst-period play. Focusing on the case where I = 2, we now consider a
productive e￿ciency scheme, in which ￿rms do not communicate but rather set prices in a way
that ensures productive e￿ciency in each period. Clearly, in the ￿rst period of such a scheme,
16 Simply compare the pro￿ts of the two equilibria for each type, and note that the di￿erence is convex. The
stated inequality holds (with equality) for the uniform distribution, for example.
29the ￿rms can achieve productive e￿ciency only if they use a pricing strategy that is strictly
increasing in costs and symmetric across ￿rms.
Productive E￿ciency Scheme: A set of strategies such that, in each period, announcements
are uninformative and market share proposals are not binding (qi;t ￿ 1): The ￿rst-period pricing
strategy of ￿rm i is denoted ￿i;1(￿i;1); and is strictly increasing and symmetric across ￿rms. Each
￿rm infers the other ￿rm’s cost once ￿rst-period prices are observed. Let ￿w and ￿l denote,
respectively, the inferred cost of the \winner" (the lower-cost ￿rm) and \loser" (the higher-cost
￿rm) in the period-one pricing contest. Each ￿rm adopts a stationary price along the equilibrium
path in periods t > 1: Let ￿(￿w;￿l) denote the price selected by the winner in periods t > 1;
and we suppose that the loser charges " more. We restrict attention to ￿(￿w;￿l) 2 [￿w;￿l]:17 In
all periods, any o￿-schedule deviation induces the belief threat punishment, as described below
in Section 5.2.
When ￿rms use a productive e￿ciency scheme, an o￿-schedule deviation may become ap-
parent due to an inconsistency between a ￿rm’s ￿rst-period and (say) second-period prices.
For example, suppose ￿rm i has type ￿i;1 and undertakes an on-schedule deviation in period
1 by mimicking the price of a higher type, ^ ￿i;1 > ￿i;1: Suppose ￿rm j ’s type is lower than
^ ￿i;1; so that ￿rm j wins the ￿rst-period pricing contest and enters period 2 with the belief that
^ ￿i;1 = ￿l > ￿w = ￿j;1: If the scheme speci￿es a period-2 price for ￿rm j such that ￿i;1 < ￿(￿w;￿l);
then ￿rm i will charge the price ￿(￿w;￿l)￿" in period 2. Firm i’s period 2 behavior then reveals
its ￿rst-period deviation, and in period 3 the ￿rms proceed to the belief threat punishment.
Productive e￿ciency equilibria are di￿cult to construct. Separation in the ￿rst period must
be achieved, even though the ￿rst-period price may a￿ect beliefs and thereby future pro￿ts. A
subtlety arises because of a potential non-di￿erentiability of payo￿s in the ￿rst period for a ￿rm
of type ￿i;1 at ￿i;1(￿i;1): If ￿rm i charges ￿i;1(^ ￿i;1) for ^ ￿i;1 > ￿i;1 in the ￿rst period; it is possible
that ^ ￿i;1 > ￿j;1 > ￿i;1; in which case ￿rm i will undercut ￿rm j’s period-2 price, ￿(￿j;1; ^ ￿i;1). On
the other hand, if ￿rm i charges ￿i;1(^ ￿i;1) for ^ ￿i;1 < ￿i;1; it is possible that ^ ￿i;1 < ￿j;1 < ￿i;1; in
which case ￿rm i would not select the period-2 price ￿(^ ￿i;1;￿j;1) but would instead set a higher
price (e.g., above r) and earn zero pro￿t. Thus, payo￿s change at di￿erent rates for \upward"
deviations than for \downward" deviations. However, if ￿(￿w;￿l) is strictly increasing in both
arguments at appropriate rates, it is possible to exactly equalize the incentive to deviate upward
with the incentive to deviate downward.
Strict monotonicity of ￿(￿w;￿l) in turn requires that the ￿rst-period pricing schedule places
each ￿rm type above its static reaction curve (i.e., at a price such that ￿rst-period expected
pro￿t would be higher if a slightly lower price were selected). Intuitively, when a ￿rm con-
templates an increase in its ￿rst-period price, it then foresees a loss in its ￿rst-period expected
17 This restriction is required if a productive e￿ciency scheme is to be used in an PPBE: if ￿(￿w;￿l) < ￿w; the
winner would deviate (e.g., price above r) in period 2; and if ￿(￿w;￿l) > ￿l, the loser would deviate and undercut
the winner in period 2.
30pro￿t, and this loss is balanced against the bene￿t of the higher future price, ￿(￿w;￿l); that the
￿rm would enjoy were it to win the ￿rst-period pricing contest.
In the supplementary material for this article, we establish that a productive e￿ciency


























(1 ￿ F0(e ￿i))de ￿i > ￿: (5.3)
For any ￿ < 1; the conditions hold when F0 is su￿ciently close to uniform. As well, for any F0;
the conditions hold if ￿ is su￿ciently small.
Proposition 6. Consider Model 2 and suppose I = 2. If (5.2) and (5.3) are satis￿ed, then
there exists a productive e￿ciency equilibrium. Speci￿cally, in the ￿rst period, each ￿rm i uses
the following strategy:







(1 ￿ F0(e ￿i))de ￿i:
Let ￿w = min(￿1;1;￿2;1), while ￿l = max(￿1;1;￿2;1): If ￿rm i is the low-cost ￿rm in period 1,
then for all t > 1; ￿rm i sets price







while ￿rm j 6= i sets price pj;t = ￿(￿w;￿l) + " for " > 0:
Conditions (5.2) and (5.3) are satis￿ed in a rich parameter space; however, when they are
not satis￿ed, a productive e￿ciency equilibrium may fail to exist. Intuitively, the highest-cost
type (￿) gets no future pro￿t and thus prices at cost in the ￿rst period. All other types, however,
distort their ￿rst-period prices upward, in an attempt to signal higher costs and thereby secure
a higher future price. If ￿rms are very patient, the bene￿t of a higher future price is signi￿cant,
and greater distortions in the ￿rst-period price are incurred. It is then possible that higher-cost
types may price above ￿ and thus the ￿rst-period price of the highest-cost type. This implies
a non-monotonicity in the ￿rst-period pricing function, in contradiction to the hypothesis of a
separating equilibrium.
We conclude that separating equilibria with productive e￿ciency exist under certain conditions.18
Such equilibria are characterized by strategic signaling in the ￿rst period. They thus repre-
18 As we show in the supplementary material section, when I = 2; if the parameters of the model satisfy
conditions (5.2) and (5.3), then the cross-partial of the pro￿t function for type ￿i;1 that mimics type ^ ￿i;1 is
globally positive. Standard arguments then ensure that global incentive compatibility is implied by local incentive
compatibility. When I > 2; we can show that an analogous productive e￿ciency equilibrium exists if ￿ is
su￿ciently small; however, a di￿erent proof is required, since the cross-partial of the pro￿t function for type ￿i;1
that mimics ^ ￿i;1 becomes negative for ^ ￿i;1 su￿ciently close to ￿ ￿. For I > 2; we use numerical methods to verify
directly that global incentive compatibility is satis￿ed if ￿ is su￿ciently low for the uniform distribution.
31sent the Bertrand counterpart to the separating equilbria constructed by Mailath (1989) for a
two-period model with di￿erentiated products and perfectly persistent cost types.
5.2. Belief Threat Punishment
We now consider punishments that are not themselves equilibria at the start of the game,
because they rely on beliefs that may only arise following a deviation from equilibrium. We
seek to identify the most severe punishment of this sort. To this end, we employ the belief
threat punishment: a deviant ￿rm is forever after believed to have the lowest cost and is thus
expected to charge a low price, regardless of the subsequent path of play, which in turn makes
it rational for non-deviating ￿rms to punish with their own low prices.
Belief Threat Punishment: Suppose that ￿rm i engages in an o￿-schedule deviation in
period ￿: All ￿rms j 6= i thereafter believe that ￿rm i has the lowest costs, ￿; and they set the
price pj;t = ￿ + 2" in all future periods t > ￿, regardless of the evolution of play.
Now, if ￿rm i indeed did have cost ￿, then its best response against the belief threat
punishment following its own deviation would in fact be to set pi;t = ￿ + ": If ￿rm i does not
have low cost, it chooses any price greater than pj;t: This behavior is sequentially rational - each
￿rm is doing its best from any point forward, given its beliefs and the equilibrium strategies of
other ￿rms. Furthermore, this is the most severe possible punishment outcome, since a deviant
￿rm earns zero pro￿t in the continuation game, independent of the discount factor.
While the belief threat punishment serves as a useful benchmark, it is not entirely plausible.
An immediate objection to the construction just presented is that all ￿rm j’s adopt dominated
strategies (pricing below cost, for all histories) in the continuation. This objection can be
handled easily, however, if we modify the above strategies to include a carrot-stick component.
Carrot-Stick Belief Threat Punishment: Suppose that ￿rm i engages in an o￿-schedule
deviation in period ￿: The ￿rms then impose a belief threat punishment with the modi￿cation
that, in period t > ￿, if the deviant ￿rm i plays pi;t = ￿ + " and each ￿rm j 6= i plays
pj;t = ￿ + 2"; then with some probability ￿ 2 (0;1) the ￿rms switch to the best rigid-pricing
equilibrium: Otherwise, they continue with the described punishment strategies.
For ￿ su￿ciently low, the deviant ￿rm still earns approximately zero pro￿t. But it is now a strict
best response for a non-deviant ￿rm j to select pj;t = ￿+2" throughout the punishment phase:
this strategy induces a distribution over zero and positive pro￿ts, whereas any other strategy
induces zero or negative pro￿t in the current period and serves only to delay the eventual escape
to the collusive continuation. Thus, the described strategies are no longer dominated. In this
case, the continuation play itself requires a discount factor that is su￿ciently high, since ￿rms
must be dissuaded from undercutting r in the punishment phase when ￿ > 0:
32The (carrot-stick) belief threat punishment implies a new critical discount factor for the
best rigid-pricing equilibrium. Formally:
Proposition 7. Consider Model 2 and suppose ￿ > (I ￿ 1)=I: Then, there exists a best rigid-
pricing equilibrium. If ￿rm i deviates, the continuation entails a carrot-stick belief threat
punishment, and so ￿rms j 6= i price at ￿ + 2" in subsequent periods, and ￿rm i prices above
￿ + 2" unless its cost type is less than ￿ + 2".
Proof: See Appendix.
The critical discount factor (I ￿ 1)=I is strictly less than ￿c; and so we now have a lower
critical discount factor for supporting the best rigid-pricing equilibrium. We note that (I￿1)=I
is also the standard critical discount factor for Bertrand supergames with complete information.
Thus, if we are willing to impose the (carrot-stick) belief threat punishment, then incomplete in-
formation does not necessitate a higher discount factor in order to support the optimal collusive
arrangement (under log-concavity).
While the equilibrium of Proposition 7 entails undominated strategies, one may object that
the non-deviating ￿rms might relinquish their worst-case beliefs after a deviation, if the deviant
￿rm consistently did not price at ￿ + ": Our speci￿cation requires a dogged pessimism: even if
the deviant ￿rm i hasn’t priced at ￿ + " yet, each ￿rm j 6= i remains sure that ￿rm i will do
so tomorrow. Standard re￿nements also do not eliminate this equilibrium. The belief threat
punishment as stated, however, is not robust to the possibility of imperfect persistence.
6. Conclusion
We analyze a dynamic Bertrand game (or equivalently, a series of procurement auctions), in
which prices are publicly observed and each ￿rm is privately informed as to its costs. Costs are
independent across ￿rms, but each ￿rm’s cost exhibits persistence over time. We characterize
the set of collusive equilibria, giving particular emphasis to the collusive scheme that is optimal
for ￿rms at the start of the game. When costs are perfectly persistent, if the distibution of costs
is log concave and ￿rms are su￿ciently patient, then the optimal collusive scheme entails price
rigidity. While it is possible in some circumstances for ￿rms to implement separating equilibria
with productive e￿ciency, these equilibria are not optimal. When costs can take two types and
are imperfectly persistent, some productive e￿ciency is typically optimal. First-best collusion
is possible if the ￿rms are su￿ciently patient relative to the degree of persistence.
With the basic modeling framework now established, a number of exciting extensions may
be considered. For example, it would be interesting to examine the model when ￿rms face
￿xed costs and participation in the market is endogenous. A tension might then arise between
collusion and predation, with the latter option perhaps having particular appeal to a ￿rm that
believes its unit cost is relatively low. Likewise, it would be interesting to include an investment
33process, whereby ￿rms could endogenously in￿uence their respective cost distributions.19
At a methodological level, our analysis is novel in that we characterize optimal cooperation
in a dynamic game with persistent, private information. In many applications, agents seek
a self-enforcing cooperative relationship, and private information is important and persistent.
The techniques developed here should be useful for such applications.
7. Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Consider the strategies described in the text. We refer to the
equilibrium starting with price pw as being in the \war" state. Let ~ vcs
i (￿i;t;pw;￿) be the
discounted pro￿t to ￿rm i with cost type ￿i;t in period t if the ￿rms are in the war state.
In order to use the same expressions for Models 1 and 2, we use the f￿; ￿ ￿g notation through-
out the proof. For Model 1, we use the notation that











(1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿￿ ￿))￿ + ￿(1 ￿ ￿￿)￿ ￿
1 ￿ ￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿ ;








￿i;t = ￿ ￿
#
=
(1 ￿ ￿￿￿)￿ ￿ + ￿￿￿ ￿￿
1 ￿ ￿
￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿ :
For Model 2, in the work below, we use the convention that ￿￿i;t = ￿i;t and ￿￿ = 1 > 0 = ￿￿ ￿:
We begin by representing the continuation values in collusive and war states. In both

































i(￿i;t) + (1 ￿ ￿)~ vcs
i (￿i;t;pw;￿)]:






￿ ￿r + (1 ￿ ￿) pw




We next characterize further the war-state continuation value function. Using (7.2), we
observe that
~ vcs
i (￿i;t;pw;￿) ￿ ~ vcs
i (￿ ￿;pw;￿) =
(￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿i;t)
I(1 ￿ ￿)
: (7.3)
19 See Fershtman and Pakes (2000, 2004) for numerical analyses of endogenous investment among colluding
￿rms in related settings.
34Thus, ~ vcs
i (￿i;t;pw;￿) is simply ~ vcs
i (￿ ￿;pw;￿) plus a type-dependent function of model primitives,
and so the most severe war state is achieved (pointwise) if ~ vcs
i (￿ ￿;pw;￿) is reduced to the min-
imum value possible in a carrot-stick pooling equilibrium. To determine this minimum value,
we consider a particular o￿-schedule incentive constraint in the war state; namely, type ￿ ￿ must
be deterred from setting a price above pw. With such a deviation, type ￿ ￿ would earn zero pro￿t
in the current period and induce the war state in the next period. The relevant constraint is
~ vcs
i (￿ ￿;pw;￿) ￿ ￿[￿￿ ￿~ vcs
i (￿;pw;￿) + (1 ￿ ￿￿ ￿)~ vcs
i (￿ ￿;pw;￿)]; (7.4)
where we recall that ￿￿ ￿ = 0 in Model 2. Using (7.3), we may rewrite (7.4) and determine the
desired minimum value:
~ vcs
i (￿ ￿;pw;￿) ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿
(￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿)
I(1 ￿ ￿)2: (7.5)
Notice that when ~ vcs
i (￿ ￿;pw;￿) = ￿￿￿ ￿
(￿￿ ￿￿￿￿)
I(1￿￿)2; we have from (7.3) that
vcs
i (￿i;t) ￿ ~ vcs
i (￿i;t;pw;￿) = ￿￿￿ ￿
(￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿)
I(1 ￿ ￿)2 +
(￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿i;t)
I(1 ￿ ￿)
: (7.6)
We may use (7.2) to con￿rm that vcs
i (￿ ￿) = ￿￿￿ ￿
(￿￿ ￿￿￿￿)




￿ ￿ ￿ pw
r ￿ ￿ ￿
: (7.7)
Given (7.7), we note that ￿ 2 [0;1] and pw 2 [0;r) if and only if
maxf0;
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿r
1 ￿ ￿
g ￿ pw ￿ ￿ ￿: (7.8)
Fixing vcs
i (￿ ￿) = ￿￿￿ ￿
(￿￿ ￿￿￿￿)
I(1￿￿)2, we next consider the remaining o￿-schedule incentive constraints
in the war state. First, if pw ￿ ￿i;t; then type ￿i;t must be deterred from deviating to a price
higher than pw: The relevant constraint is vcs
i (￿i;t) ￿ ￿E￿i;t+1[vcs
i (￿i;t+1)j￿i;t]: When ￿i;t = ￿ ￿;
this constraint is equivalent to (7.4) and thus holds here with equality. For ￿i;t < ￿ ￿; the
constraint is strictly satis￿ed, since ￿ < 1 and vcs
i (￿i;t) > vcs
i (￿ ￿) ￿ 0 follows from (7.6). Second,
if pw > ￿i;t; then type ￿i;t must be deterred from undercutting pw: The relevant constraint is
then vcs
i (￿i;t) ￿ pw ￿ ￿i;t + ￿E￿i;t+1[vcs
i (￿i;t+1)j￿i;t]: It is straightforward to verify that if this
constraint holds for ￿; then it holds for all higher types. Using (7.6), we may then derive that
this constraint is satis￿ed if and only if pw ￿ ￿ +
(￿ ￿￿￿)
I ￿ pw 2 (￿;￿): Summarizing, when
vcs
i (￿ ￿) = ￿￿￿ ￿
(￿￿ ￿￿￿￿)
I(1￿￿)2; the remaining o￿-schedule constraints hold in the war state if and only if
the following condition holds:
if pw > ￿; then pw ￿ ￿ +
(￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)
I
￿ pw 2 (￿;￿): (7.9)
What is the critical discount factor above which we can satisfy vcs
i (￿ ￿) = ￿￿￿ ￿
(￿￿ ￿￿￿￿)
I(1￿￿)2 while
also satisfying (7.9)? As (7.8) reveals, when ￿ is low, the former may require the selection of
35a high pw; however, a high pw may lead to a failure of the latter. We determine the critical
discount factor by setting pw = pw and ￿ = 1; and then solving (7.7) for ￿: The solution is
￿w =
￿ ￿ ￿ pw
r ￿ pw
=
(￿ ￿ ￿)(I ￿ 1)
(r ￿ ￿)I ￿ (￿ ￿ ￿)
2 (0;1): (7.10)
For ￿ < ￿w; we cannot satisfy all of the o￿-schedule constraints for a carrot-stick pooling
equilibrium. For ￿ ￿ ￿w; we may specify pw and ￿ so as to satisfy all o￿-schedule constraints
while generating vcs
i (￿ ￿) = ￿￿￿ ￿
(￿￿ ￿￿￿￿)
I(1￿￿)2. To this end, we select pw = pw and ￿ = ￿ ￿; where
￿ ￿ ￿ 1￿￿
￿
￿￿pw
r￿￿ : For ￿ ￿ ￿w; pw satis￿es (7.8), and thus ￿ ￿ 2 [0;1]:
We come next to the o￿-schedule constraints in the collusion state, taking as given the
strategies and payo￿s for carrot-stick as just described. For Model 1, the o￿-schedule incentive
constraint is now
vr
i(￿i;t) ￿ r ￿ ￿i;t + ￿[￿￿i;tvcs
i (￿) + (1 ￿ ￿￿i;t)vcs
i (￿ ￿)]: (7.11)
In Model 2, the o￿-schedule incentive constraint takes the form
vr
i(￿i;t) ￿ r ￿ ￿i;t + ￿vcs
i (￿i;t): (7.12)
For each model, straightforward calculations con￿rm that the o￿-schedule constraint is most
di￿cult to satisfy when ￿i;t = ￿: Thus, allowing now for either model, we may use (7.1) and
(7.6) and conclude that the o￿-schedule constraint holds in the collusion state if and only if




This constraint holds if and only if ￿ ￿ ￿c; where ￿c is the unique ￿ 2 (0;1) that satis￿es:
￿ =
(r ￿ ￿)I ￿ (r ￿ ￿￿)




Solving (7.13), we obtain that
￿c =
(r ￿ ￿)(I ￿ 1)
(r ￿ ￿)I ￿ (￿ ￿ ￿)
: (7.14)
Finally, given that r > ￿; a simple comparison of (7.10) and (7.14) reveals that 1 > ￿c >
￿w > 0: Thus, in both models, the o￿-schedule constraint for the collusion state determines the
critical discount factor, and that discount factor is ￿c as de￿ned in (7.14). Hence, if ￿ ￿ ￿c; we
may enforce collusion at r using a carrot-stick punishment scheme, with pw = pw and ￿ = ￿ ￿.
Proof of Corollary 1: First, we ￿x ￿ > ￿c for ￿c given in (7.14), and observe that the
rigid-pricing equilibrium exists, when cost types are su￿ciently persistent (i.e., as ￿L ! 1 and
￿H ! 0). This follows since ￿c is independent of the degree of persistence.
36Second, if cost types are perfectly persistent but there are two possible cost types, then
to show that the ex ante optimal PPBE is the best rigid-pricing scheme, we may mimic
the proof approach used for Proposition 2, except that we now need to ￿nd the condition
analogous to log-concavity for the two-type model.20 Analogous to the proof of Proposi-
tion 2, we consider a relaxed program, whereby we choose ￿ Ri(￿i;1) and ￿ Mi(￿i;1) to maximize
E￿i;1
h
￿ Ri(￿i;1) ￿ ￿i;1 ￿ Mi(￿i;1)jF0
i
subject to the following set of constraints: ￿ Ri(￿i;1) ￿ r￿ ￿ Mi(￿i;1)




= 1=(I(1￿￿)) (ex ante symmetry constraint);
￿ Ri(￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ Mi(￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ Ri(￿) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ Mi(￿) (IC-down), and ￿ Ri(￿) ￿ ￿ ￿ Mi(￿) ￿ ￿ Ri(￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ ￿ Mi(￿ ￿) (IC-up).
It is straightforward to show that (IC-down) and (IC-up) imply that ￿ Mi(￿i;1) is nonincreasing
(market share monotonicity), and given that, (IC-up) must be slack unless ￿ Mi(￿) = ￿ Mi(￿ ￿);
and further ￿ Ri(￿ ￿) = r ￿ ￿ Mi(￿ ￿) (if not, ￿ Ri(￿ ￿) could be increased). In turn, it can be shown that
(IC-down) must bind. Then, substituting in the (IC-down) constraint, the objective can be
written ￿ Mi(￿ ￿)(r ￿ ￿ ￿) + F0(￿) ￿ Mi(￿)(￿ ￿ ￿ ￿): Substituting in the ex ante symmetry constraint,
the problem becomes to choose ￿ Mi(￿ ￿) ￿ 1=(I(1 ￿ ￿)) (where the bound comes from ex ante
symmetry and market share monotonicity) to maximize






￿ ￿ Mi(￿ ￿)(1 ￿ F0(￿))
￿
(￿ ￿ ￿ ￿):
This expression is linear in ￿ Mi(￿ ￿); and it is increasing in ￿ Mi(￿ ￿) if and only if (r ￿ ￿ ￿)=(￿ ￿￿￿)>
1 ￿ F0(￿); as desired. Thus, under the parameter restriction, the solution is ￿ Mi(￿ ￿) = ￿ Mi(￿) =
1=(I(1 ￿ ￿)) and ￿ Ri(￿i;1) = r ￿ ￿ Mi(￿i;1); which can be implemented as a PPBE using the best
rigid-pricing policy.
Third, de￿ne the following objects. For the purposes of this proof, we modify our no-











indicates that the expecta-
tion is taken using transition probabilities f￿0
L;￿0
Hg: Further, we modify the de￿nition of ~ ￿i
to include the arguments f￿0
L;￿0
Hg; so that ~ ￿i(￿;F￿i;0;h0;￿i;1;f￿0
L;￿0
Hg) is calculated using
transition probabilities f￿0
L;￿0
Hg; where h0 denotes the null history. Let ￿ =f￿tg1
t=￿: De￿ne
￿ ￿n
i (￿) ￿ E￿i;1[~ ￿i(￿;F￿i;0;h0;￿i;1;f￿n
L;￿n
Hg)jF0]: De￿ne the present discounted values of market

































20 See Athey and Bagwell (2001) for a related argument when cost types that are i.i.d. over time.
37where, for all t ￿ 1;
sj;t = (￿j;t;￿j;t; j;t) = ￿j;t(ht￿1) for all j 2 f1;::;Ig;
zj;t = (aj;t;pj;t;qj;t) = sj;t(￿t(^ ￿i;1;￿￿i;1);￿j;1) for all j 6= i;




i (￿) ￿ E￿i;1[~ ￿i(￿;F￿i;0;fg;￿i;1;f1;0g)jF0] = E￿i;1 [Ri(￿i;1;￿;f1;0g) ￿ ￿i;1Mi(￿i;1;￿;f1;0g)]:
Let ￿R ￿ f￿R
t g1
t=1 be the extensive-form strategies for the best rigid-pricing scheme. For a
given ￿; let c(￿; ^ ￿i) denote the strategy derived from ￿ by following the behavior that ￿ would
assign if the ￿rm had realizations of type ^ ￿i in every period. Finally, de￿ne a strategy ￿n to be
individually rational given f￿n
L;￿n
Hg, if, starting from each period t (and given each possible ht
and induced beliefs ￿￿i;t); each ￿rm i expects average per-period payo￿s of at least zero from
that point on. Since each ￿rm can always guarantee pro￿ts of 0 by charging a price su￿ciently
high, only individually rational strategies can be used in a PPBE.
Fourth, we need to prove the following claim: for all " > 0; there exists n￿ such that for all
n > n￿; ￿ ￿n
i (￿) ￿ ￿ ￿n
i (￿R) < " for all ￿ such that ￿ is individually rational given f￿n
L;￿n
Hg; and
such that ￿ ￿n
i (￿) ￿ ￿ ￿n
i (c(￿; ^ ￿i)) for ^ ￿i 2 fL;Hg: If this claim is true, we would conclude that for
high enough n; the best rigid-pricing policy approximates the payo￿s that could be attained
using the best strategy that is immune to a deviation where a ￿rm pretends to be type L in
every period, as well as to all deviations where a ￿rm pretends to be type H in every period.
Clearly, the best strategy that is immune to this limited class of deviations yields pro￿ts at
least as high as the best PPBE strategy.
To establish the claim, we proceed by contradiction. In particular, consider the following
hypothesis, which we refer to as the no-convergence hypothesis, or NC: that there exists " > 0;
such that for all n￿, there exists n0 > n￿ and a corresponding ￿n0





is individually rational given f￿n0
L ;￿n0
Hg, and ￿ ￿n0
i (￿n0
) ￿ ￿ ￿n0
i (c(￿n0
; ^ ￿i)) for ^ ￿i 2 fL;Hg:
For each ￿n0
and each ^ ￿i;1; we can calculate Mi(^ ￿i;1;￿n0
;f1;0g) and Ri(^ ￿i;1;￿n0
;f1;0g): Since
these are real numbers drawn from compact subsets of the real line, there exists a convergent
subsequence. Call the limits M￿
i (^ ￿i;1) and R￿
i(^ ￿i;1); and restrict attention to that subsequence.
We then argue that ￿ ￿n0
i (￿n0
) converges to E￿i;1[R￿
i(￿i;1)￿￿i;1M￿







i (￿i;1)jF0]￿ ￿ ￿￿
i (￿n0
) converges to zero. Start by














This converges to zero by de￿nition of R￿
i(￿i;1) and M￿
i (￿i;1).
38To show that ￿ ￿￿
i (￿n0
) ￿ ￿ ￿n0
i (￿n0
) converges to zero, recall that ￿ ￿￿
i and ￿ ￿n0
i di￿er at a given
strategy pro￿le ￿ only because they place di￿erent weights on the probability that di￿erent
histories are realized; in particular, ￿ ￿￿
i is calculated assuming that costs do not change over
time, while ￿ ￿n0




individually rational, following all histories, ￿rm i’s expected discounted future payo￿s must be
between 0 and
r￿￿
1￿￿: For a given ￿; ￿ ￿￿
i (￿) and ￿ ￿n0
i (￿) di￿er only following a period where some
￿rm experiences a cost change, in which case the di￿erence between expected payo￿s from from
that point on (computed using f￿n
L;￿n
Hg) is at most
r￿￿
1￿￿: Consider the case where ￿n
L ￿ 1￿￿n
H




is an lower bound on the probability that up until period t, no ￿rm experienced a cost change,
and (1 ￿ (￿n0
L )I) is an upper bound on the probability that a cost change occurs in period t,
￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿￿



















This bound does not depend on ￿, and so ￿ ￿￿
i (￿)￿￿ ￿n0
i (￿) converges to zero uniformly as n0 ! 1
(and ￿n0
L ! 1): This implies that ￿ ￿￿
i (￿n0
) ￿ ￿ ￿n0
i (￿n0
) converges to 0.
Finally, note that as n0 ! 1, ￿ ￿n0







: So, by the main-
tained hypothesis NC, E￿i;1[R￿
i(￿i;1) ￿ ￿i;1M￿
i (￿i;1) ￿ 1
1￿￿
1
I(r ￿ ￿i;1)jF0] ￿ "; and
R￿
i(￿) ￿ ￿M￿
i (￿) ￿ R￿
i(￿ ￿) ￿ ￿M￿
i (￿ ￿); R￿
i(￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ ￿M￿
i (￿ ￿) ￿ R￿




i (￿i;1) ￿ Mi(￿i;1;￿n0
;f￿0
L;￿0
Hg) is nonincreasing (a consequence of the assumption
￿ ￿n0
i (￿n0
) ￿ ￿ ￿n0
i (c(￿n0
; ^ ￿i)) for ^ ￿i 2 fL;Hg), E￿i;1[Mn0
i (￿i;1)jF0] = 1=(I(1 ￿ ￿)) (by ex ante
symmetry), and since Mn0
i (￿i;1) 2 [0;1=(1￿￿)] for all ￿i;1; M￿
i (￿i;1) has these properties as well.
Similarly, since Ri(￿i;1;￿n0
;f1;0g) 2 [0;r=(1 ￿ ￿)]; R￿
i(￿i;1) 2 [0;r=(1 ￿ ￿)].
But, we already argued that R￿
i(￿i;1) = r
I(1￿￿); M￿
i (￿i;1) = 1=(I(1￿￿)) maximizes E￿i;1[R￿
i(￿i;1)￿
￿i;1M￿
i (￿i;1)] subject to (7.15) and the latter set of requirements on R￿
i and M￿
i , a contradiction.












(1 ￿ (I ￿ N)Mcs(z))
￿
is the market share that a type on [￿;z) expects to receive in all periods after period 2. To
satisfy the ￿rst-period on-schedule constraint, pL must satisfy
(pL￿z)
￿
































1 ￿ (1 ￿ F0(z))I￿1￿




39Note that pL < r, and that pL decreases with ￿; because the expected market share in periods
t > 1 is greater when pL is chosen.
By construction, if ￿ ￿ ￿c, then the o￿-schedule constraints are satis￿ed for periods t > 1:
Now consider the o￿-schedule constraints in period 1. There is no gain to making a deviant
announcement, since announcements are uninformative. The most pro￿table price deviations
entail undercutting either pL or r. All possible deviations in quantity restrictions in the ￿rst
period are dominated by price deviations: undercutting a price of pL or r guarantees that the
￿rm wins the market, and undercutting r guarantees a positive pro￿t for all types.
Let us begin by considering the temptation to undercut pL in the ￿rst period. Note that
if pL < ￿i;1, which will hold as ￿ approaches 1, then the incentive to undercut pL disappears.
So, this constraint only arises for moderate ￿: On-schedule incentive compatibility tells us that
types on [z; ￿ ￿] prefer to use their assigned strategies rather than mimic types below z. Thus,
it is su￿cient to check that all types prefer to follow the behavior assigned to types on [￿;z)
rather than undercut pL: The latter constraint can be represented as follows:
￿
1 ￿ (1 ￿ F0(z))I
F0(z)I
￿
(pL ￿ ￿i;1) +
￿
1 ￿ ￿





(￿ ￿ ￿ ￿i;1):
(7.16)















(￿ ￿ ￿ ￿i;1):
The ￿rst-period bene￿ts from a deviation are smaller with the market-sharing two-step scheme,
because pL < r and
1￿(1￿F0(z))I
F0(z)I > 1
I; the future bene￿ts to cooperating are higher because
ML(z) > 1
I. Thus, if ￿ ￿ ￿c, so that the best rigid-pricing scheme is feasible, then (7.16) will
be satis￿ed as well, and the critical discount factor such that (7.16) is satis￿ed is less than ￿c:
Now consider the temptation to undercut the price of r. First consider this temptation for
types ￿i;1 2 [￿;z): The o￿-schedule constraint is more di￿cult to satisfy as ￿i;1 increases on [￿;z),
because in all periods the market share is higher from following the equilibrium strategies than
from engaging in the deviation and then switching to the carrot-stick equilibrium. Thus, lower
cost types ￿nd the equilibrium strategy relatively more appealing. The ￿rst-period o￿-schedule
constraint that deters this deviation for all ￿i;1 2 [￿;z) is then
￿
1 ￿ (1 ￿ F0(z))I
F0(z)I
￿
(pL ￿ z) +
￿
1 ￿ ￿






(￿ ￿ ￿ z)






1 ￿ (1 ￿ F0(z))
I￿1
￿￿
where the equality follows by the de￿nition of Mcs(z): Substituting in for pL yields
￿
1 ￿ ￿













40For ￿ ￿ ￿c; we know Mcs(z) < 1
I: The left-hand side is thus strictly greater than the value, L; it
achieves when Mcs(z) is replaced with 1
I; likewise, the right-hand side is strictly lower than the
value, R; it achieves when Mcs(z) is replaced with 1
I: Comparing, we ￿nd that L > R; and so
(7.17) is satis￿ed as a strict inequality. Intuitively, the prospect of future market share Mcs(z)
is enough to deter a deviation in period 2, when the gain in market share from undercutting r
is greater than it is in period 1 because some opponent types will choose pL in period 1; thus,
the promise of Mcs(z) in the future is more than enough to deter a deviation in period 1.





















(￿ ￿ ￿ ￿i;1):





























(￿ ￿ ￿ ￿i;1) ￿ Mcs(z)(r ￿ ￿i;1)
￿
:
The left-hand side of this expression is positive for all ￿i;1 if ￿ ￿ ￿c: The right-hand side is
decreasing in ￿i;1; since 1
I > Mcs(z): So we look for conditions under which the right-hand side
is negative when ￿i;1 = z. Substituting in for Mcs(z); we use the fact that
1
I
(￿ ￿ ￿ z) ￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿ + ￿
1
I
￿ ￿ ￿ z
r ￿ z
￿




(￿ ￿ ￿ z) ￿ (r ￿ z)
￿
(1 ￿ ￿);
which is negative, to establish that the right-hand side of (7.18) is negative. Thus, the critical
discount factor such that (7.18) holds is less than ￿c.
Proof of Proposition 4: We begin by representing beliefs and payo￿s under the odd-even
scheme. Given at￿2; ￿rm j’s belief about ￿i;t for i 6= j at the start of period t is given by
￿i;t(ai;t￿2) = ￿H(1 ￿ ￿ai;t￿2) + ￿L￿ai;t￿2: Given at; ￿rm j’s belief about ￿i;t+1 for i 6= j at the
start of period t + 1 is given by ￿i;t+1(ai;t) = ￿ai;t: We let voe
i (^ ￿i;t;￿i;t;at￿2) be the expected
discounted value of payo￿s for ￿rm i in an odd period t, given at￿2 and at the point where ￿rm
i has just observed its cost type ￿i;t; if it mimics type ^ ￿i;t throughout periods t and t + 1; but
expects to report truthfully from period t+2 onwards. This function can be de￿ned recursively
for each ￿rm i, as follows:
voe


























With this de￿nition in place, we observe that on-schedule deviations can be deterred if
voe
i (￿i;t;￿i;t;at￿2) ￿ voe
i (^ ￿i;t;￿i;t;at￿2) for all at￿2; ^ ￿i;t;￿i;t:
41Note that for ￿rm i, whether ￿rm i’s report in period t ￿ 2 was truthful or not does not a￿ect
expected payo￿s or beliefs.
O￿-schedule deviations can happen in either odd periods or even periods. Since announce-
ments do not a￿ect the prices of opponents, o￿-schedule deviations in announcements are not
tempting. The most tempting o￿-schedule deviation for ￿rm i in an odd period is to price at
r ￿ ", which leads ￿rm i to capture the whole market. Such a deviation would be followed by
reversion to the worst carrot-stick equilibrium. This deviation is deterred if
voe
i (￿i;t;￿i;t;at￿2) ￿ r ￿ ￿i;t + ￿E￿i;t+1 [vcs
i (￿i;t+1)j￿i;t] for all ￿i;t;at￿2:
A similar deviation must be deterred in even periods, after ￿rm i learns ￿i;t+1 :
￿e
i(￿i;t;￿￿i;t)(r ￿ ￿i;t+1) + ￿E￿i;t+2 [voe
i (￿i;t+2;￿i;t+2;￿i;t;￿￿i;t)j￿i;t+1]
￿ r ￿ ￿i;t+1 + ￿E￿i;t+2 [vcs
i (￿i;t+2)j￿i;t+1] for all ￿i;t;￿￿i;t;at￿2;￿i;t+1:
If this latter constraint holds, then no matter what happened in the odd period (in particular,
whether ￿rm i was honest then), ￿rm i does not wish to deviate in the subsequent even period.
We now proceed to construct the scheme described in the proposition. In our constructed
odd-even scheme, prices are always equal to r on the equilibrium path. In addition, ￿o
i(￿t) = 1=I
unless ￿j;t = L and ￿￿j;t = (H;::;H) = H for some j: Further, when ￿rm i alone reports low
costs, for j 6= i; ￿o
i(￿i;t = L;￿￿i;t = H) = (I ￿ 1)￿ + 1=I; ￿o
j(￿i;t = L;￿￿i;t = H) = 1=I ￿ ￿;
￿e














r ￿ E￿i;t+1 [￿i;t+1j￿i;t = H]
: (7.20)
We ￿rst show that the constructed odd-even scheme satis￿es all on-schedule incentive con-
straints. Reports in odd period t only a￿ect play in periods t and t+1 on the equilibrium path.
Further, a su￿cient condition for the on-schedule constraints to hold is that they hold pointwise
in ￿￿i;t: Thus, the on-schedule constraints are satis￿ed if, for every ^ ￿i;t; ￿i;t and ￿￿i;t, we have
￿
￿o
i(^ ￿i;t;￿￿i;t) ￿ ￿o
i(￿i;t;￿￿i;t)
￿











Suppose that ￿￿i;t has no component equal to L: It is straightforward to check that (7.19) is
de￿ned so that (7.21) is exactly binding for ￿rm i when ^ ￿i;t = L; ￿i;t = H and ￿￿i;t = H.
42Simple calculations reveal that
(r ￿ L)(r ￿ E￿i;t+1 [￿i;t+1j￿i;t = H]) ￿ (r ￿ H)(r ￿ E￿i;t+1 [￿i;t+1j￿i;t = L])
(7.22)
= (H ￿ L)r[1 + ￿H ￿ ￿L] ￿ H[H ￿ ￿L(H ￿ L)] + L[H ￿ ￿H(H ￿ L)]
> (H ￿ L)H[1 + ￿H ￿ ￿L] ￿ H[H ￿ ￿L(H ￿ L)] + L[H ￿ ￿H(H ￿ L)]
= (H ￿ L)2￿H > 0;
where the ￿rst inequality uses r > H and both inequalities use imperfect persistence (￿H > 0):
Given (7.22), it is direct to verify that (7.21) is slack when ^ ￿i;t = H; ￿i;t = L; and ￿￿i;t = H.





i(H; ￿￿i;t) = 1=I; so that (7.21) holds. Finally, suppose that
￿￿i;t has exactly one component equal to L: Then ￿o
i(L;￿￿i;t) = 1=I > ￿o
i(H;￿￿i;t) = 1=I ￿ ￿;
and ￿e
i(L;￿￿i;t) = 1=I; while ￿e
i(H;￿￿i;t) is equal to the right-hand side of (7.20). Then, it is
straightforward to verify that (7.21) holds exactly for this ￿￿i;t when ￿i;t = H and ^ ￿i;t = L.
Further, using (7.22), it is direct to verify that the constraint is slack for this ￿￿i;t when ^ ￿i;t = H
and ￿i;t = L: Thus, all on-schedule constraints hold for this scheme.
Next, we represent payo￿s for the constructed odd-even scheme, and we verify that this
scheme improves expected pro￿ts relative to the best rigid-pricing scheme, wherein all market
shares are equal to 1=I and prices equal to r on the equilbrium path. To simplify notation,
consider i = 1 and take t odd: First, observe that unless ￿t = (L;H) or ￿t = (H;￿￿1;t) where
￿￿1;t has exactly one component equal to L, all market shares in t and t+1 are equal to 1=I; and
there is then no di￿erence between the constructed odd-even scheme and the best rigid-pricing
scheme. If ￿t = (L;H); ￿rm i expects pro￿ts over the next two periods equal to
￿o
1(L;H) ￿ (r ￿ L) + ￿￿e
1(L;H)
￿
r ￿ E￿1;t+1 [￿1;t+1j￿1;t = L]
￿
= (r ￿ L)=I + ￿
￿
r ￿ E￿1;t+1 [￿1;t+1jL]
￿
=I
+(I ￿ 1)￿ ￿
 
(r ￿ L) ￿
(r ￿ H)
￿
r ￿ E￿1;t+1 [￿i;t+1j￿1;t = L]
￿
r ￿ E￿1;t+1 [￿1;t+1j￿1;t = H]
!
> (r ￿ L)=I + ￿
￿
r ￿ E￿1;t+1 [￿1;t+1jL]
￿
=I;
where the ￿nal term gives the two-period expected pro￿t under the best rigid-pricing scheme,
and the inequality follows from (7.22). Finally, consider the case where exactly one component
of ￿￿1;t is equal to L, and ￿1;t = H: Then, ￿rm 1 expects pro￿ts over the next two periods
equal to








r ￿ E￿1;t+1 [￿1;t+1j￿1;t = H]
￿￿
r ￿ E￿1;t+1 [￿1;t+1j￿1;t = H]
￿
:
Relative to a scheme with all market shares equal to 1=I; the di￿erence is ￿￿ ￿ (r ￿ H) + ￿ ￿
(r ￿ H) = 0: Thus, for all ￿t, ￿rm i’s expected pro￿ts over t and t + 1 are sometimes higher
and never lower under the constructed odd-even scheme.
43Finally, we observe that the o￿-schedule constraints hold with slack when ￿ > ￿c and all
market shares are equal to 1=I; by the equivalence of the best rigid-price scheme and the odd-
even scheme in that case. Since equilibrium payo￿s in the odd-even scheme are continuous
in market shares, if ￿ > ￿c; then for ￿ > 0 small enough, the o￿-schedule constraints will be
satis￿ed in the odd-even scheme with partial pooling as well.
Proof of Proposition 7: We established above that the carrot-stick belief threat punishment
does not entail the use of weakly dominated strategies. Let ￿(￿i;1) be the present discounted
value a deviant ￿rm expects in the carrot-stick belief threat punishment. For ￿i;1 ￿ ￿+2"; this
value is approximately ￿(￿i;1) = ￿￿ 1





Higher types price above ￿ + 2" and thus receive ￿(￿i;1) = 0: For any ￿i;1, ￿rm i does not gain





￿ r ￿ ￿i;1 + ￿￿(￿i;1): (7.23)
Rewriting, we obtain
(I￿1)(r￿￿i;1)+I￿￿(￿i;1)
I(r￿￿i;1)+I￿￿(￿i;1) ￿ ￿: The left-hand side is increasing in ￿(￿i;1): Thus,
for ￿ su￿ciently small, ￿(￿i;1) is arbitrarily close to zero for all ￿i;1, and we are sure to satisfy
(7.23) if ￿ > (I ￿ 1)=I:
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